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The Act on the National Bank of Hungary, enacted by Parliament and
effective as of 13 July 2001, defines the primary objective of the Bank as
the achievement and maintenance of price stability. Using an infla-
tion targeting system, the Bank seeks to attain price stability by imple-
menting a gradual, but firm disinflation programme over the course of
several years. In order to provide the public with a clear insight into the
operation of central bank policies and enhance transparency, the Bank
publishes the “Quarterly Report on Inflation”, covering recent and pro-
spective developments in inflation and evaluating the macroeconomic
developments determining inflation. This publication summarises the
projections and deliberations that underlie the decisions of the Mon-
etary Council.
The Monetary Council, the supreme decision making body of the Na-
tional Bank of Hungary, carries out a comprehensive review of the ex-
pected development of inflation once every three months, in order to
establish the monetary conditions that are consistent with achieving
the inflation target. The first section of the publication presents the
Monetary Council’s position and the grounds for its decisions. This is
followed by a projection prepared by the economists at the Bank’s Eco-
nomics Department on the outlook for inflation and the underlying
principal macroeconomic developments. The expected path and uncer-
tainty of the exogenous factors used in the projection reflect the opin-
ion of the Monetary Council.

4 NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARY
5AUGUST 2002 • QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION
Contents
STATEMENT OF THE MONETARY COUNCIL’S POSITION 7
SUMMARY 11
I. INFLATION 12
I. 1 Previous projection and flation developments in the second quarter 12
I. 1. 1 Assessment of second-quarter CPI data 12
I. 1. 2 The May inflation projection versus the actual data 13
I. 1. 3 Assumptions of the May forecast and their realisations 13
I. 1. 4 Sources of the difference between the May projection and actual data 14
I. 2 Projecting the consumer price index 15
I. 2. 1 Assumptions of the central projection 16
I. 2. 2 Details of the central projection 17
I. 2. 3 Uncertainty in the central projection 19
II. DEMAND AND OUTPUT 21
II. 1 Demand 21
II. 1. 1 External demand 22
II. 1. 2 Fiscal stance 23
II. 1. 3 Household consumption, savings and fixed investment 25
II. 1. 4 Corporate investment 27
II. 1. 5 Inventory investment 28
II. 1. 6 External trade 29
II. 1. 7 External balance 30
II. 2 Output 31
III. LABOUR MARKET AND COMPETITIVENESS 34
III. 1 Employment 35
III. 2 Labour reserves and tightness 36
III. 3 Wage inflation 36
III. 4 Productivity and competitiveness 38
IV. MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS 40
IV. 1 International economic environment and risk perception 40
IV. 2 Interest rate and exchange rate developments 42
IV. 3 Capital flows 43
IV. 4 Long-term yields 45
6 NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARY
V. SPECIAL TOPICS 48
V. 1 The exchange rate pass-through to domestic prices – model calculations 48
V. 2 How large is the Hungarian inflation differential vis-á-vis Europe? Some results
         from a new comparative study 49
V. 3 How do central banks in Central Europe forecast inflation? 50
V. 4 An analysis on the potential effects of EU entry on Hungarian food prices 51
V. 5 A handbook on Hungarian economic data 52
V. 6 The economic consequences of adopting the euro 53
7AUGUST 2002 • QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION
Statement of the Monetary Council’s Position
5 August 2002.
At its meeting on 5 August 2002, the Monetary Council discussed and approved the  Bank’s Quar-
terly Report on Inflation to be published on August 15.
Over the past few months, National Bank officials have held
discussions with members of the Government on the expected
course of economic developments, and the economic policy to
be adopted. These economic policy objectives have also been
incorporated into the Government’s medium-term programme
entitled A Turnaround in Economic Policy. The projections pre-
sented in the Report are based on the assumption that the
programme’s objectives are achieved.
From a monetary policy perspective, this medium-term eco-
nomic policy strategy is primarily aimed at preparing the Hun-
garian economy for joining the euro area by the year 2007. Achiev-
ing this objective requires reducing the general government defi-
cit below 3% of GDP in 2005 in terms of European standards and
meeting the inflation criteria for euro-area membership. The
medium-term programme prescribes continuous economic
policy adjustment in order to meet the reference values set for
2005. The Govern-
ment intends to re-
duce the general go-
vernment deficit
measured according
to European stan-
dards to 4.5% of GDP
in 2003, and the av-
erage rate of infla-
tion to 5% for 2003
as a whole and 4.5%
at the year-end.
With its monetary
policy measures, the
Bank will seek to
implement a path
for inflation consis-
tent with the me-
dium-term econo-
mic policy program-
me. The designated
path is not in contra-
Agreement on key elements of
economic policy strategy
The objective is to prepare
Hungary for joining the euro
area in 2007
The central bank’s efforts are
aimed at preventing inflation
exceeding 4.5% in December
2003
Inflation projection fan chart*
Percentage changes on a year earlier
* The fan chart shows the probability distribution of the
outcomes around the central projection. The central band
with the darkest shading includes the central projection.
The entire coloured area covers 90% of all probabilities.
Outside the central projection (centred around the mode),
the bands represent 15% probability each. For the specific
values of the individual bands in the fan chart have been
estimated relying on the Bank’s historic forecast errors
and the uncertainties perceived by the Monetary Council
regarding the current forecast. The year-end points rep-
resent the fixed inflation targets (7%, 4.5% and 3.5%),
while the straight lines mark the ±1% tolerance intervals
on either side of the target rates.
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Statement of the Monetary Council
Fiscal adjustment and wage
growth in accordance with the
targeted economic policy path
will reduce the real economic
costs of meeting the inflation tar-
get
diction with the Bank’s earlier target rate of 3.5±1% set for De-
cember 2003, as the central bank’s efforts are aimed at keeping
inflation below 4.5%. Accordingly, the Bank wishes to adopt asym-
metric responses to the economic developments that bear on
the course of inflation. This means that should the central infla-
tion projection leave the target range over the forecast horizon,
the Monetary Council will control the path for inflation via chang-
ing the monetary conditions. On the other hand, if the level of
inflation remains within the target range, the Monetary Council
will be tolerant of rates not exceeding 4.5%.
In the Monetary Council’s assessment, recent macroeconomic
developments have constituted an upside risk to inflation. The
most crucial inflationary pressure is this year’s nearly 10% rise in
household consumer demand and the rapid wage growth in the
private sector. At the same time, the path prescribed by the
Government’s medium-term economic strategy may considerably
lower inflationary pressure next year. Domestic demand growth
will likely be mitigated by a cut in the general government deficit
to 4.5%, measured by European standards. In the Monetary
Council’s interpretation, the Government’s objectives also include
keeping private-sector gross wage growth from exceeding 5% in
annual terms.  Thanks to prospective measures taken to reduce
taxes, even this moderate rise in gross wages will ensure a 3%
increase in net real earnings.  Wage growth in accordance with
the targeted economic policy path will reduce the real economic
costs of meeting the inflation target
In contrast, wage increases exceeding the Government’s tar-
get may necessitate some monetary tightening, in order to meet
the inflation targets. Wage increases unadjusted to the disinflation
path may undermine corporate competitiveness, hampering eco-
nomic growth and  increase in the number of jobs, via adverse
effects on exports and investment.
On the basis of the fiscal and wage growth targets laid down in
the Government’s medium-term economic policy programme,
the Bank projects inflation to be 5.1% in December 2002 and
4.3% in December 2003. However, although the central projec-
tion remains within the target range, the upside risk to inflation
is considerable in 2003. The main source of the risk lies in the
rate of private-sector wage growth. Should wages increase faster
than the designated path, this would increase the likelihood that
inflation exceeds 4.5% at end-2003. This risk is also reflected in
the shape of the inflation projection fan chart.
The Council believes that provided that medium-term economic
policy strategy drafted by the Government is successfully imple-
mented, there will be no need to change the monetary conditions,
consistent with the assumptions underlying the Bank’s current
projections. The Monetary Council monitors the economic devel-
opments that pose a risk to inflation. Should domestic demand
and wages continue to increase at the current fast pace, a tighten-
ing in monetary conditions would be required in the future.
National Bank of Hungary
Monetary Council
Costs of deviating from the tar-
get path
Provided the economic policy
path is implemented, inflation
can be kept below 4.5% at end-
2003, but there is still consider-
able upside risk to inflation.
Implementing the economic
policy strategy may help avoid
the need for monetary tightening
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Summary Table of Forecasts*
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Summary
The current Report differs from the May issue in two main respects. First, it takes account of the
effect of fiscal policy change, while the previous projection assumed a ‘constant fiscal policy’. Sec-
ond, the projections for 2003 are conditional on the Government’s announced medium-term eco-
nomic policy programme, with special regard to the areas of fiscal policy and the assumed private-
sector wage growth.1
Thus, in the Bank’s projection, gross wages in the private sector increase at a slowly declining
pace in 2002. In 2003, in turn, based on the medium-term programme, we assume that private-
sector gross wage growth remains exceptionally subdued, with this year’s roughly 13% projection
for wage inflation down to 5%.
Accordingly, the real economy projection has been significantly revised from that in the May
Report. Household consumption is assumed to expand more rapidly, causing domestic absorption
to expand faster than GDP. The current projection is for higher economic growth, at 3.8% in 2002
and 4.7% in 2003.
The consumer price index (CPI) is projected to be 5.1% in December 2002, and in next December
conditional on the Government’ economic policy strategy forecasted to decline to 4.3%. Compared
with the May Report, we have somewhat decreased our forecast for the end-2002 inflation, but raised
it significantly for December 2003. The rate of inflation at the year-end falls within the upper section
of the 4.5% target point ±1% range and is close to the upper limit of the target 3.5% target point ±1%
range in December 2003.
In the Monetary Council’s judgement, there are two factors that represent upside risk to the afore-
mentioned central projection in 2003. First, should gross earnings rise at a higher rate next year than
assumed in the medium-term economic policy programme, that would trigger both cost push and
demand pull inflationary pressures. Second, faster regulated price increases than the technical as-
sumption underlying the central projection would also raise the level of inflation. Accordingly, the
fan chart, representing the uncertainty in the inflation projection relative to the inflation target
range, indicates considerable upside risk to inflation at end-2003.
1 See A Turnaround in Economic Policy (see the Ministry of Finance web site).
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Chart 1.1 CPI and core inflation
(year-on-year change, %)
2 The July CPI data (4.6%) arrived after finalising this Report. Though the headline
figure shows a steady disinflation, it is largely effected by the canceling the TV-set
operation charges and transitory decline in unprocessed food prices.
1 Inflation
I. 1 Previous projection and inflation
developments in the second quarter
Consumer prices rose by 5.5% in 2002 Q2 relative to thesame period last year, meeting the forecast published in
the May Report. This value was 0.7 percentage points lower
than the average rate of inflation in Q1. The fall in core infla-
tion from 6.7% in Q1 to 5.9% is another evidence of disinflation
remaining uninterrupted in the period under review.2
I. 1. 1 Assessment of second-quarter CPI data
The disinflation experienced in Q2 was to a large extent due
to the price developments of some volatile groups of the CPI
which can hardly be influenced by monetary policy, namely
the fall of prices of unprocessed food and vehicle fuel in June.
In case of unprocessed food, the price movements of certain
seasonal foodstuffs and pork should be accentuated. The ap-
preciation of the euro against the dollar was the major reason
behind the fall of fuel prices.
On the other hand, the price indices for tradable goods and
market services, which are of primary interest to monetary
policy, were also lower in Q2 than in the previous quarter, al-
though the rate at which the latter fell slowed. Tobacco prices
rose, influenced by the full-year effect of the tax increase at
the start of the year.
Movements in the price index for tradables have shown
stable disinflation since the change to monetary regime, which
is perhaps best exemplified by the drop in the quarter-on-quar-
ter price indices. This decline is primarily an indication of the
delayed effect of nominal appreciation of the forint during the
period since the intervention band was widened in May 2001.
Over the longer term, however, a lasting drop in the price
index can only be expected if the rate of wage growth adjusts
to the lower inflation environment. The annual index for mar-
ket services, being the most sensitive component of the CPI to
movements in wages and demand, has been flat since March.
Explanation for this must be the exceptionally strong growth
rate of household consumption.
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I. Inflation
Chart I-2. Development of unprocessed food prices
(Annualised month-on-month growth rates, seasonally ad-
justed)
Chart I-3. Bread and cereals price level
(December 1991 = 100)
3 Our forecast is based on the June CPI figures. The 4.6% July CPI is somewhat lower
than our forecast. As this difference is due to one-off factors, we do not change our
projection.
Movements in unprocessed food prices were shaped basi-
cally by two similar events in Q2. First, vegetables prices expe-
rienced a correction following the price increases of the early
months of the year. Second, pork prices (in euros) went below
European levels. The latter deserves special mention, given the
strong influence pork price movements tend to exert on the
prices of a number of unprocessed foods.
Within processed foods, the rise in bread prices in April–May
was perhaps the most noticeable event. Prices rose in the pe-
riod despite the fall in both the producer price of cereals and
the consumer price of flour. In the Bank’s analysis, recent de-
velopments in bread prices reflect a staggered hike pattern
which might resemble the pricing behaviour of cartels.
Within the category of alcoholic drinks and tobacco, rising
tobacco prices dominated price developments in Q2. The ex-
cise tax increase at the start of the year only fed through to
consumer prices in the spring. The slow decrease in the amount
of inventories may be an explanation for this, in addition to
other factors.
I. 1. 2 The May inflation projection versus the
actual data
Average inflation in 2002 Q2 met the Bank’s inflation projec-
tion published in May; however, core inflation turned out to
be 0.2 percentage points higher than the forecast. This shows
that the accuracy of the CPI forecast reflected the ‘benign’ de-
velopments in some of the components with a high degree of
volatility.
Calculations by Bank staff show that, from among the items
most relevant for the overall consumer prices index, there were
differences in the forecasts and the actual outcomes for the
prices of foods, market services, motor fuel, and alcoholic
drinks and tobacco.
Below we examine the extent to which the forecast error
may be linked to the divergent developments in exogenous
variables relative to the forecast and, beyond the resulting er-
ror, to probably capturing inflation developments inadequately
during the analysis.
I. 1. 3 Assumptions of the May forecast and their
realisations
Table I-2 provides evidence that, except for imported inflation
and the dollar/euro exchange rate, the most important exog-
enous variables developed in line with the forecast.
German tradables price inflation has been used to estimate
the measure of imported inflation.3 Its annualised monthly rate
was previously assumed to return from its high levels in Q1
gradually to the historical average of 0.5% during the course of
the year, resulting in an annualised monthly rate of 1.1% on
the average of 2002. In contrast with the expectation, German
tradables prices have fallen strongly since April. Chart I-4. is
also a good illustration of the fact that there has not been a
comparable decline in average prices of the euro-area coun-
tries.
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
Ju
n.
0
1
Ju
ly
.0
1
A
ug
.0
1
S
ep
t.
0
1
O
ct
.0
1
N
ov
.0
1
D
ec
.0
1
Ja
n.
0
2
Fe
b.
0
2
M
ar
.0
2
A
pr
.0
2
M
ay
.0
2
Ju
n.
0
2
P
er
ce
nt
350
370
390
410
430
450
470
490
510
530
550
Ja
n.
9
9
A
pr
.9
9
Ju
ly
.9
9
O
ct
.9
9
Ja
n.
0
0
A
pr
.0
0
Ju
ly
.0
0
O
ct
.0
0
Ja
n.
0
1
A
pr
.0
1
Ju
ly
.0
1
O
ct
.0
1
Ja
n.
0
2
A
pr
.0
2
D
ec
.
1
9
9
1
=
1
0
0
$%"

&''(	'
)

*+
)'
,

-
"	'	'
 >*		  


	>*		  
: 
! "

	>	
$  
.!		
 (
	 "?$  #%
&''(	
',
	

*+

&"
,
)
-

$%"

$
*+
(.	
,
"
,
	

',
/
 , , , , ,
0! , , , #, #,
/ , , , , ,
8		
 %, , ,% #, ,
'	3  , , , , #,
'	3#! 
**
5 , , , #,% ,
@* 
(
 , #%, #, #, #,

*
		 , , , ,% ,
1
	!  , %, %, #, ,
 0 0 0 0 0

	)"	 0 0 0
	

		
'	5
!7 
 ((#
 6 #
 
6/.5	##5	
*	,?
4 *
"?$
6	5
14 NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARY
I. Inflation
I. 1. 4 Sources of the difference between the May
projection and actual data
While the actual outcome for the headline CPI was in line with
the forecast published in the May Report, there were notice-
able differences on the level of the subgroups of the CPI, both
in the upwards and downwards direction. Inflation turned out
to be higher than the forecast within the categories of processed
foodstuffs, market services and alcoholic drinks and tobacco,
partly as a result of unforeseen events (such as bread prices
and the slow re-pricing process of tobacco), and partly due to
the stronger-than-expected increase in household consump-
tion. On the other hand, price indices of unprocessed food-
stuffs and vehicle fuels were below the projection, which might
be the consequence of disinflationary movements in certain
exogenous factors.
The price index for unprocessed foods remained below the
forecast. The major reason for this may have been that, unlike
in most European countries, the increase in vegetables prices
early in the year failed to reverse itself by March, and so the
resulting high level of prices was thought to remain lasting. In
contrast, prices did correct in June. One of the possible expla-
nations for this may be the substitution of imported goods
causing extraordinary price increases with domestic products.
The actual outcome for inflation of processed food prices
was higher than the forecast. The surprise increase in bread
prices was the primary explanation for this, as was noted ear-
lier.
The projection for the tradables price index was broadly
comparable with the actual outcome. This may be linked to
the use over the short run of methods which took the inertia
of the time series into account. Conceivably, the fall in imported
inflation may have been in the background of the actual being
0.1 percentage point lower than the forecast, although the ef-
fect of this at such a short horizon is insignificant.
The forint/euro exchange rate and imported tradables price
inflation are the two most important factors affecting price
movements in the model used to forecast tradables inflation,
while other, domestic cost and demand factors have a smaller
weight. The Bank’s current forecast takes into account emphati-
cally the delay in the effect of last year’s appreciation on do-
mestic tradables prices, attributable to a one-off shock.
The actual outturn for market services prices was 0.3 per-
centage points higher than the forecast. This gap may be ex-
plained by the difference between projected and actual house-
hold consumption, which was a factor causing inflation to be
higher.
Vehicle fuel prices fell more strongly than projected, reflect-
ing the lower euro equivalent of the price of oil on account of
a stronger-than-expected euro exchange rate vis-á-vis the dol-
lar. This also provides explanation for the lower-than-forecast
actual outcome for the market energy price index.
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I. 2 Projection of the consumer price
index
The current projection estimates the CPI to be 5.1% at end-2002, dropping to 4.3% at end-2003.4 This projection partly
reflects the effects of economic policy measures that have un-
folded since the May Report. In addition to these protracted
effects, at the Monetary Council’s request, the underlying as-
sumption for the 2003 projection is that the path designated
by the Government in the medium-term economic policy
programme will be implemented. However, in the absence of
specific information about prospective regulatory price mea-
sures, the Bank staff have used simple technical assumptions
in this context.
In the Monetary Council’s view, there are two areas consti-
tuting an upside risk to the aforementioned central projections
for 2003. First, should the growth in average earnings in the
private sector exceed the rate assumed in the medium-term
economic policy programme, this will exert inflationary pres-
sures both on the cost and demand sides. Second, should regu-
lated prices increase faster than assumed in the central projec-
tion, this will lead to higher inflation than the figure calculated.
Hence, the fan chart representing the uncertainty in the infla-
tion projection shows that the risks to inflation are weighted
considerably to the upside for end-2003, relative to the target
range. While there is an over 60% likelihood that the CPI will
remain within the target range at the end of 2002, the corre-
sponding figure drops to 30% next year, together with a sharp
rise in the probability that the rate will exceed the upper toler-
ance limit of 4.5%.
Our new CPI projection for end-2002 has fallen slightly, while
that for end-2003 rose considerably compared with the fore-
casts in the May Report. In 2002 this is explained by certain
onetime regulatory measures offsetting the initial inflationary
Chart I-5.  Inflation projection fan chart*
(year-on-year change, %)
4 When this projection was made, the latest data reported by the Central Statistical
Office were the those of  June 2002.  IDE  jön egy megjegyzés a júliusi tényekről
* The fan chart shows the probability distribution of the
outcomes around the central projection. The central band
with the darkest shading includes the central projection.
The entire coloured area covers 90% of all probabilities.
Outside the central projection (centred around the mode),
the bands represent 15% probability each. When the
fanchart shows significant upside or downside risks the
mode should not lie in the middle of the darkest band. The
uncertainty intervals have been estimated relying on the
Bank’s historical forecasting errors and the uncertainties
perceived by the Monetary Council regarding the current
forecast. The year-end points represent the fixed inflation
targets (7%, 4.5% and 3.5%), while the straight lines mark
the ±1% tolerance intervals on either side of the target rates.
The fan chart is always based on the quarterly CPI projec-
tions, so the end-of-the-year (December) target points are
not directly comparable to quarterly data points.
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pressure of stronger household demand. For example, the July
cancellation of the television set operation fee has reduced the
CPI by 0.3 percentage points on its own, from the original pro-
jection for December 2002 of 5.4%. However, such beneficial
regulatory measures affect the price level only on one-off oc-
casions, thus failing to reflect genuine disinflation. This is con-
firmed in the sharp increase in the projection for core infla-
tion from the level projected in the May Report, up by roughly
one percentage point over the next nine months, and only ex-
pected to decline to 0.3 percentage point towards the end of
the forecast period.
For the greatest part of 2003, household demand is likely to
exert a pull on inflation, due to the rapid expansion of incomes
seen this year. Hence, core inflation remains relatively high
until mid-2003. Within the assumed regulatory framework, the
index for regulated prices is approximately 6% in December
2003, failing to offset the inflationary pressure of household
demand.
The inflation projection for end-2003 has increased by 0.9
percentage points compared with the May Report. This has
been caused by equal contributions from four major factors,
namely the higher private sector wage level in 2002 and rising
household consumption, assumed regulatory changes, the
evolution of the forint exchange rate as well as exogenous fac-
tors (such as agricultural product prices, world oil prices and
the dollar/euro exchange rate).
I. 2. 1 Assumptions of the central projection
The current Report is lased on a forint weaker than in the May
Report. Based on the approach of assuming monetary policy
to remain unchanged, the average forint/euro exchange rate
prevailing in the last month for which actual data are available,
i.e. July, is assumed for the entire forecast horizon. This rate is
4.3 forints (1.8%) weaker than the value assumed in the May
Report, causing higher inflation projection by 0.2 percentage
points.
Imported inflationary pressures on domestic inflation have
shifted in a downward direction relative to three months ago.
Recent months have seen a drop in the price of German trad-
able goods, with oil prices also falling in forint terms, due to
the weaker dollar exchange rate. The resulting downward pres-
sure on the CPI in 2002 amounts to 0.2-0.3 percentage points.
The Bank projects similar oil prices as in May, drawing on a
number of different sources of information. At the Monetary
Council’s proposal, guided by risk management considerations,
the projection continues to be based on the higher assump-
tion of market analysts’ consensus oil price forecast and the
constant oil price. Hence, the current projection for future oil
prices continues to assume the constant price.
Viewed as transitory, the spring def lation in German
tradables prices has not been fully incorporated into the pro-
jection. One indication of the transitory nature of this defla-
tion is that tradables price inflation in the euro area seems to
be more in a state of stagnation. Hence, cheaper tradable im-
ports are mostly likely to have only a short-term effect on do-
mestic disinflation.
Chart I-6. The May and current assumptions for the
forint/euro exchange rate
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Chart I-7.  Assumed Brent oil price developments *
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* Analyst expectations: average of data for Goldman Sachs, J.P. Mor-
gan, Merrill Lynch, BNP-Dresdner, Lehman Brothers, Deutsche Bank.
The Consensus Economics survey is based on a July 15 survey.
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High private sector wage increases in the labour market and
certain government measures in 2002 are assumed to exert sig-
nificant upward pressure on household incomes relative to the
previous projection. The ensuing demand-pull inflation spills
over to the greatest part of 2003, primarily in respect of market
services, tradables and food prices. At the request of the Mon-
etary Council, the current projection assumes restraint in gross
wage growth in the private sector in the next year, as proclaimed
in the context of the Government’s medium-term strategy.
I. 2. 2 Details of the central projection
The exogenous factors will likely be characterised by down-
ward pressure from imported inflation on domestic prices.
Based on consultation with specialists from the Agricultural
Economic Research and Information Institute (AKII), this year’s
projection is for a moderately rising agricultural inflation pro-
file and some acceleration next year. Price and tax regulation
moderates administered price increases in 2002, at the same
time pushing up alcohol and tobacco prices. In contrast, 2003
will likely witness a reversal in this trend, according to the
Bank’s technical assumption. Analysis of the endogenous fac-
tors suggests that the rise in labour costs in 2002 will not cause
significantly higher supply-side inflationary pressure than pro-
jected previously, and will exert downward pressure on infla-
tion in 2003, according to the Monetary Council’s assumption.
This year’s buoyant household spending will greatly hamper
the disinflation process in 2003, primarily in respect of market
services, but also in tradables and processed foodstuffs.
The Bank’s projection for tradables prices is 0.5 and 0.8 per-
centage point higher for end-2002 and end-2003, respectively,
than was assumed in the May Report. This implies that no de-
flationary developments are likely even at the end of the fore-
cast period in respect of the overall group of tradable goods
(although durables prices are forecast to fall). This implies that
stronger consumer spending will likely boost demand for
tradables, and consequently, non-durable goods prices will take
longer to adjust to the lower costs. Disinflation is also ham-
pered as the exchange rate of the forint has weakened since
the time of the previous projection.
The projection for unprocessed food prices shows moder-
ate rates of price increase this year, which will pick up sharply
in 2003, relative to the forecast of the May Report. The unproc-
essed food price profile remains broadly unchanged, with the
price level for cereals, vegetables and fruits assumed to remain
largely the same as in the May projection. The difference arises
from the base effect created by the difference between the
prices seen so far in the year and the previous projection.
One crucial item in the category of unprocessed food is meat
products, which experienced a sharp drop in consumer prices,
down by as much as 10% in the period up to June, due prob-
ably to supply factors. The current projection for the purchase
price of pork is different from the previous forecast inasmuch
as the current projection also incorporates the upward pres-
sure exerted by the export subsidies announced in late July
for domestic pork prices. As the prices start from a much lower
level than in the projection based on actual data for April, prices
will likely increase considerably more rapidly over the com-
Chart I-8. Assumptions for imported tradables
prices in the May and current projection *
(Annualised quarter-on-quarter change, seasonally ad-
justed by NBH)
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Chart I-9. Household consumption in the previous
and the current projection
(year-on-year change, %, seasonally adjusted)
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
wa
ge
co
st
an
d
ag
gr
eg
ate
de
m
an
d
re
gu
lat
ion
(p
ric
es
an
d
tax
es
)
HU
F/E
UR
ex
ch
an
ge
ra
te
ex
og
en
ou
s f
ac
to
rs
in 2002 in 2003
Chart I-10. Decomposition of the difference
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Chart I-11. Projection for tradables price inflation
(Annualised quarter-on-quarter change, seasonally ad-
justed)
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ing one and a half years, with pork prices gradually returning
to around the average level of EU prices.
While European fruit and vegetable prices stopped increas-
ing or even started falling as early as the beginning of the year,
the price shock affecting the Hungarian domestic market only
faded with a delay of several months. Due to the extreme vola-
tility in the prices of products in this category, the Bank was
cautious in its estimation, assuming the trend of price increase
to be around expected inflation.
Processed food price inflation is higher relative to the May
projection. Faster inflation in 2002 is partly due to the effect of
second-quarter price increases. Late in the year, a probable rise
in demand will also contribute to the difference between the
current and previous projections for the inflation of processed
food prices. The relative fall in labour costs in 2003 will exert
disinflationary pressure, somewhat dampened by feed-through
from faster unprocessed food price increases, with special re-
gard to unprocessed meat and cereal prices, forecast to rise by
double-digit figures.
Inflation in the prices of market services is projected to in-
crease sharply, up on the previous projection by 1.1 percent-
age point in 2002 and 0.8 percentage point in 2003. This sug-
gests that consumption, which has been expanding twice as
fast as in the May projection in this year, significantly boosts
demand for market services, accelerating services price infla-
tion in 2002. Disinflation may pick up early in 2003, due to
lower labour costs, but the process will likely be interrupted
as a result of strong consumer spending up to the final quar-
ter. The inflation differential also reflects demand-pull infla-
tionary pressure, with the gap between inflation in market ser-
vices and tradables widening temporarily and only returning
below the current value in late 2003.
As stressed at the start of this Chapter, the projection for the
regulated price profile for 2002 has changed markedly. One
crucial change was that television set operation charges has
been cancelled from mid-year, leading to a roughly 0.3 per-
centage point drop in the headline CPI.5 Another major differ-
ence from the previous path for regulated prices is that piped
gas is not forecast to rise this year. Together with the postpone-
ment of an increase in the price of subsidised pharmaceuti-
cals, this will contribute another 0.3 percentage point to
disinflation this year.
The Bank has neither specific estimates nor information of
approved measures of regulation for next year. Thus we apply
the simple technical rule explained in the May Report of as-
suming average price increase consistent with the inflation
target next year. Whenever price increases are put off during
this year, the Bank uses the technical rule of simply adding the
rate of this year’s postponed increase to the previous projec-
tion for next year’s inflation. Hence, in the current projection
based on the aforementioned technical assumption, the price
Chart I-12. Projection for processed food price
inflation
(Quarter-on-quarter annualised changes, seasonally ad-
justed data)
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Chart I-13. Projection for market services inflation
(Quarter-on-quarter annualised changes, seasonally ad-
justed data)
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5 For more on the Central Statistical Office’s methodology, see the information re-
leased together with the CPI data on 11 July. In addition to the regulated operation
charges, the set of television-related fees also comprise the price of HBO and cable
televisions’ basic packages. The Statistical Office intends to calculate an average
price for the latter two components. The change will cause an approximately 30%
shift in the price index of the group, but have no effect in 2003.
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of piped gas increases by 16% in 2003. This raises the May
Report’s 3.8% projection for regulated price inflation at end-
2003 to 6.0%.
Vehicle fuel prices are determined partly by world oil prices
and the forint/euro and dollar/euro exchange rates and partly
by excise duties. The current projection reflects the base ef-
fect of the spring drop in import costs over the one-year fore-
cast horizon. Furthermore, there was also a change in the rate
of excise duty rise on July 1, when the tax valorisation of die-
sel oil turned out to be smaller. The assumption for excise duty
regulation also applies the aforementioned technical rule, i.e.
when a particular tax rise is postponed in the course of the
current year; the assumption is that it will be implemented in
the following year. Hence, in addition to the previous net rise
of 5 forints in 2003, next year’s projected price also includes
the excise duty increase on diesel oil postponed from this year.
Changes in the previous projection for alcohol and tobacco
prices are also largely due to changes in excise duty regula-
tion. This year’s second rise in tobacco excise duties enters
into effect in August. The Bank assumes that this rise has been
brought forward from a later date of next January. The increase
represents a 20% rise in the fixed tax measure, which corre-
sponds to one percentage point in the percentage measure.
This measure will likely cause tobacco prices to rise by about
10%, which is expected to feed through to retail prices gradu-
ally as stocks run out. Note, however, that the technical rule
mentioned above also applies here. As a price measure brought
forward in time, no more changes are assumed in the tobacco
tax rule in next year’s projection.
I. 2. 3 Uncertainty in the central projection
In the assessment of the Monetary Council, uncertainty sur-
rounding the central projection is symmetrical at end-2002,
while the balance of risks to inflation at end-2003 is on the
upside. To determine the risks to inflation, the Council formed
its judgement based on the expected trends of two key fac-
tors. These were the outcome of wage bargaining relating to
next year and the evolution of regulated prices.
In the Monetary Council’s view, the wage path assumed in
the Government’s medium-term programme is surrounded by
an upside risk to inflation. In the Bank’s estimate, each per-
centage point rise in 2003 private sector wages will raise end-
2003 CPI by 0.24 percentage points.
As noted above, based on a Monetary Council decision, a
technical rule is applied to calculating the price regulation path
for 2003. The path is based on price increases that are consis-
tent with the inflation target. In the Council’s assessment the
applied price regulation assumption also contains an upside
risk to inflation.
The inflation projection fan chart is based on the above-
noted risk factors and uncertainties. The central band, includ-
ing the outcomes with the highest likelihood, has shifted mark-
edly from that in the fan chart of the May Report. Compared
with the previous picture for disinflation, it projects a lower
inflation profile in 2002 Q3, followed by a rate remaining flat
around 5%.
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6 Calculations are based on our models used for CPI forecasting, therefore similar to
our models, are oubject to uncertainty.
The Bank staff have prepared a few simulations to demon-
strate the possible effect on inflation of change in individual
factors6. In the Monetary Council’s view the projection con-
tains no major uncertainty, apart from the aforementioned two
risk factors. The exchange rate, imported inflation and agricul-
tural prices represent a symmetrical risk involving relatively
moderate uncertainty.
Chart I-14. Central bands in the fan charts of the
current and the previous projection*
(year-on-year change, %)
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II. 1  Demand
The forecast in the May Report was based on the assumption that Hungary’s major trading partners had already re-
covered from the low point of business cycle. In contrast with
the expectation, the upturn failed to start in 2002 Q1. Growth
in Hungary’s major trading partners picked up somewhat rela-
tive to the previous quarter. But the decline in imports which
started in the previous year in Germany, a country crucial in
terms of Hungary’s outlook for exports, continued in the pe-
riod under review.
Rising household consumption expenditure was the domi-
nant factor for Hungarian economic growth in 2002 Q1. In
addition to consumption demand, fixed investment also picked
up as a result of investment activity in the general government
sector. Exports grew at a much higher rate than explained by
the indicators of external cyclical conditions. This high rate,
which was reflected in imports as well, was related to a one-off
factor.
According to the release of first-quarter data by the Hungarian
Central Statistical Office (CSO), the fall in inventory investment
and other non-specified use which started 2001 H2 continued in
2002 Q1. This, however, was not reinforced by developments in
stock data in industry, suggesting that the first-quarter data prob-
ably contain a large margin of (negative) statistical error.
In comparison with the current forecast, the central projec-
tion in the May Report only took into account the expansionary
effects on demand of fiscal measures decided up to the time of
the Report which did not require further decision-making by
the Government. In contrast with the forecast of a 1.5% increase
as a percentage of GDP, the Bank expects the fiscal demand
effect to rise by 3%, based on information obtained and mea-
sures taken by the new Government since then. At the request
of the Monetary Council the effect of fiscal policy of 2003 is
conditional on the announced medium term fiscal programme.
As a result of all these, the Bank has made a major revision
to its real economy forecast for 2002 and 2003 relative to the
previous Report. Household real income is now forecast to rise
fast in each year, resulting mainly from the Government’s policy
measures; however, in 2002 higher-than-expected private sec-
tor wage growth will likely have a role in the increase as well.
Conditional on the medium term Government programme we
assumed a modest private sector wage growth of 5% in 2003.
This low private sector wage growth can occur if the expected
widening in the gap between gross and net wages in favour of
the latter is taken into account at the wage rounds at the end
of this year, when recommended wages for 2003 are set.
II. Demand and output
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The forecast of GDP growth has also been based on projec-
tions for cyclical developments on the production side as well as
for certain items on the uses side. The forecast of developments
on the uses side would yield higher growth relative to the pro-
duction side. The value contained in the central projection is
based on the forecast for the production side showing lower
economic growth, resulting from the Bank’s cautious approach.
The discord between the two approaches has been resolved in
the ‘Inventory investment and other non-specified use’ row. From
a cyclical point of view, however, the Bank would not expect a
further depletion of stocks. Therefore, it should be noted that
the very low projection for inventories and non-specified use in
the Bank’s forecast of GDP is hard to reconcile with expected
developments in the business cycle, rather it reflects the differ-
ence between the dynamics of the production and uses sides.
A comparison of indices calculated from the annualised
quarterly percentage changes, describing the underlying cy-
clical developments, is an illustration of the Bank’s forecast.
The falling rate of growth in 2002 H1 will be replaced by a
pick-up in economic growth in H2.
II. 1. 1 External demand
Based on data released since the May Report, the external busi-
ness cycle, and within it that of the EU which is more influen-
tial in Hungary’s case, appears to have passed its trough. How-
ever, the upturn is progressing slowly and is surrounded by
uncertainties. Whereas first-quarter GDP data of Hungary’s
major trading partners showed clear signs of a recovery in 2002
Q1, their industrial output data for Q2 suggest that the upturn
has faltered. It seems that external demand for Hungarian
goods and services has not yet passed its bottom. Consequently,
the recovery has still been waiting to start, in contrast with the
Bank’s earlier expectation.
Adding to uncertainty, foreign business confidence indica-
tors, the best gauges of the likely twists in external demand
over the short term, had previously suggested the recovery to
be faster7. But second-quarter survey data suggest a stagnation
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7 The monthly business sentiment indices exhibited a sharp improvement up to
May, figures for June and July, however, refer to a renewed fall in business confi-
dence throughout major European economies, leaving the assessment of the situa-
tion uncertain.
Chart II-1. GDP growth
(Annualised quarter-on-quarter change, seasonally ad-
justed)
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in domestic absorption and a decline in imports in Germany,
the country having the largest share of demand for Hungarian
exports. In view of these new pieces of information, the Bank
has lowered the path of Hungary’s external demand relative to
that published in the previous Report, and only expects it to
register positive growth rates from Q3.
The uncertainties surrounding the possible turning point
in external demand were discussed in earlier issues of the Re-
port; and it is not the first time that the Bank has revised its
expectation of the likely start of recovery. Updates to their fore-
casts by other research institutes also appear to reflect a fur-
ther delay in the upturn – they have clearly lowered the paths
of import-based external demand relative to their earlier fore-
casts. What has not changed, however, is that they maintain
their expectation of a clear recovery in external demand from
2002 H2. This is consistent with the Bank’s current picture of
future events.
External demand is expected to decline by 0.9% on average
in 2002, due to the delay in the timing of recovery relative to
the earlier projection. However, there are less uncertainties at
the longer horizon, so the catch-up to the path of external de-
mand determined earlier by long-term economic factors will
likely start in 2003. Due to this, the Bank expects a 7.1% growth
next year, revising up the forecast published in the May Report.
II. 1. 2 Fiscal stance
In the current estimate, the expansionary effect of general
government on demand may amount to 3% of GDP this year,
in view of the information available and government measures
taken since the May Report. The 1.3% figure estimated in May
only included the effect on demand of the measures approved
before that date which needed no further decision to be imple-
mented. Conditional on the fiscal target for 2003 set in the
Government’s announced medium term programme, the gen-
eral government is assumed to contract aggregate demand by
roughly 2.4% of GDP next year.
Chart II-2.  Current and past projections for
external demand
1995 = 100
Chart II-3 Business confidence indices of the euro
zone (EABCI) and the German IFO Institute
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Data, (forthcoming).
24 NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARY
The key factor behind the upsurge in the demand effect es-
timated for this year is that the measures revealed since the
May projection may exert expansionary pressure on demand
of 1.30%.9 Another upward pressure is the fact that the actual
preliminary data for the base period turned out to be 0.15%
lower. Accurate figures for the effect of fiscal developments,
including local authorities’ excess spending on investment
projects and goods, as well as the effect of quasi-fiscal expen-
ditures represent another demand effect of 0.35%. Apart from
the effect of the 100-day programme, macroeconomic devel-
opments may earn revenues 0.10% higher than in the previous
estimate, thus reducing the expansion of demand by the same
degree.
At the Monetary Council’s request, the assumption for 2003
is that the fiscal targets set in the Government’s medium-term
programme will be met; in other words, the general govern-
ment deficit calculated using the ESA methodology drops to
4.5% of GDP next year. If the interest expenditure falls by 0.3%
of GDP, the announced target for contraction expressed as a
proportion of GDP amounts to 2.2% in 2003, defined as the
change of the primary balance10. A further assumption is that
the announced rise in the percentage limit of the pension fund
contributions that can be transferred into private funds from
6% to 8% will take place in 2003. This implies that adjusting
the improvement in the primary balance as a proportion of
GDP for the roughly 0.2% effect of the revenue missed as a
result, demand contracts by a total of 2.4% of GDP11.
A component of the fiscal stance deserving special atten-
tion is the gross wage bill of general government, which is as-
sumed to increase by 31.0%, much faster than the central pro-
jection in May (19.7%). The current projection also includes
the effect of the 50% wage rise for public servants effective
from this September. Wage bill growth in 2003 may be as high
as 16.9%, despite the fact that we assume no further discretion-
ary wage increases. The reason is that the effect of the 50%
wage rise will appear for the full year in 2003, and the rise in
civil servants’ salaries is also statutorily determined. Based on
the actual data available currently, we expect the number of
employed people in the public sector to fall by only 0.1% in
2002. The fall in employment in 2003 is forecast at 1% in 2003,
higher than projected in May.
9 Of this, the net effect of the 100-day programme of the new government, together
with its indirect effect on the rise in pensions based on the Swiss indexation, may
exceed 1% of GDP. Other factors include transfers to the agricultural sector and the
use of the increased general reserves to cover further expenditures. At the same
time, based partly on some specific statements and partly on the Bank’s own esti-
mates, there is an expectation of some minor degree of savings and postponement
in respect of a few expenditure items.
10 The inherent difficulty is that to be able to calculate the demand effect, we should
know not only the target for 2003, but the value of the ESA deficit in the base pe-
riod (2002) as well. However, the Bank derives its estimates for each year using GFS
data and its own SNA estimates, and thus cannot calculate the ESA deficit (see Chap-
ter 17, Handbook on the Use of Hungarian economic data, forthcoming). Based on
the technical assumption that the SNA and ESA deficits are changing at a similar
rate, the ESA deficit will fall by 2.5% next year, having increased by roughly 3% in
2002. From this, the demand effect is derived by the usual method, which uses the
change in the primary balance rather than that in the deficit. Then the result is
adjusted for the effect of the pension reform.
11 The pension reform meant that government enabled a certain portion of the
pension contributions to be transferred to the fully funded second pillar. The rev-
enue thus lost exerts upward pressure on the deficit, but it is assumed not to have
any effect on household demand.
II. Demand and output
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In 2002, the increase in transfer payments to households will
significantly exceed the previous projection, due to an amend-
ment to the budget. In addition to a one-time grant to old-age
pensioners and a one-month extra payment of family allowance,
regular family allowance and scholarship sums will be also raised.
These increases combined will push up nominal growth from
13.2% to 17.3%. In addition to the full-year effects appearing in
2003, there will likely be a number of measures involving pen-
sioners, which may raise nominal transfer growth to 11%.
Due to substantial amendments to the system of direct taxa-
tion, the Bank’s calculations also consider the rising gap be-
tween gross and net wages as one of the factors governing the
evolution of household income. From 2002 Q4 on, taxes on
minimum wages will be written off, thus net wages can increase
by roughly 1.5 percentage points faster than gross wages for
the year as a whole. The full-year effect of the tax write-off in
2003 together with the less pronounced effect of the measures
to be taken next year is assumed to widen the gap between net
and gross wages by 3.5 percentage points.
We estimate that the volume of public investment, includ-
ing motorway construction financed by off-budget, rose by
13.4% in 2001, one percentage point slower than indicated by
the preliminary actual data. The projection for 2002 has been
raised to 20-25%, up 7% on the forecast of the May Report. This
is primarily due to first-quarter actual figures and, to a lesser
extent, a downward revision of the projection for the invest-
ment price index. The timing of cash flow based investment
expenditure has shifted within the year, with a pick-up early in
the year and a slowdown late in the year.12 Actual data reported
by the Statistical Office suggest that these expenditures will
appear in investment statistics with a shorter time lag than
before. Three-monthly actual data and the prospective devel-
opments called for a major revision to be made to this year’s
forecast. However, with the higher base, it is unlikely that there
will be considerable volume growth for 2003 as a whole. First,
the growth rate of expenditures will gradually slow down this
year. Second, lacking information about next year, the Bank
has no projection for investment expenditures, but in view of
the deficit target, investment spending will maintain its cur-
rent level at best.
II. 1. 3 Household consumption, savings and fixed
investment
In the Bank’s current forecast for the year as a whole, con-
sumption expenditure rises by 9.8%, coupled with an increase
in the gross savings rate. Consumption expenditure growth is
7.1% in 2003, which - at the request of the Monetary Council -
is based on the assumption of a more modest wage growth
derived from the medium-term economic program of the Gov-
ernment. The faster consumption expenditure compare to real
net income results fall in the gross savings rate.
The current forecast of consumption expenditure is higher
than that in the May Report (6.1% for 2002 and 4.4% for 2003).
12 Direct spending by general government in Q1, stated with the GFS deficit, rose by
45% at current prices, but this rate of growth is expected to slow down steadily over
the next quarters.
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This can be traced to two factors. Firstly, the most important
factor is that the effects of fiscal policy measures on consump-
tion have now been taken into account, in contrast with the
previous Report. Second, data for 2002 Q1 have been released
which reveal an already very strong rise in household consump-
tion expenditure.
According to our indicators consumption expenditure in the
second and third quarter in 2002 remain strong. The house-
hold confidence index, often used in the Bank’s short-term
forecasts, rose to its highest level to date in 2002 Q2. In addi-
tion, new passenger car sales continued to rise robustly in the
period. These point at a further dynamic rise in consumption
expenditure. Although the retail sales turnover was strong, but
the sales increased more modest pace in April and May which
imply the possibility of lower consumption growth compare
to the forecast in 2002.
The forecast of consumption in 2003 is conditional on the
announced medium term economic programme of the Gov-
ernment. Thus it takes into account the Government’s plans
for changes to direct taxes, in addition to the increases public
sector wage biull and transfer payments. Also, for the Monetary
Council request the forecast is based on the assumption of a
more modest private sector gross wages growth derived from
the medium-term economic program of the Government. Ac-
cording to this assumption a lower private sector gross wage
growth will be expected in 2003, due to a falling tax burden on
personal income.
Due to the bias in year-on-year indices the analysis on in-
come and consumption expenditure is based on quarter-on-
quarter indices. Our chart displays the consumption has a less
volatile or “smoother” growth path relative to income. This
property comes from consumption smoothing assumption,
namely the considerably higher additional income in 2002
compare to 2001 is not expected to spend entirely on current
consumption, but the part of it is saved or invested to housing
by households. This extra saving can be the financial source of
consumption expenditure in 2003 when consumption growth
is expected to excess the real net income growth.
Consumption expenditure is unlikely to reflect the massive
growth in household income in full, due to the expected
smoother path of consumption. Accordingly, the gross savings
rate is now forecast to rise in 2002. The major uncertainty sur-
rounding the projection is the distribution of financial savings
and household fixed investment, the two components with the
highest weights in the gross savings rate. Households’ finan-
cial savings have not yet provided evidence of an increase in
2002 H1. But there will likely be a robust rise in wages and
social transfers in the second half of the year. In the Bank’s
view, this may lead to a rise in the financial savings rate.13
Home-building is a high-weight component of households’
investment spending. The number of completions in 2002 H1
Chart II-4. Household income and consumption
expenditure
(Annualised quarter-on-quarter change, seasonally ad-
justed)
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13 Technically, the transfer of large amounts of take-home pay to personal bank ac-
counts inevitably raises the savings rate over the short term.
14 The gross savings rate equals financial savings plus households’ investment spend-
ing minus the ratio of capital transfers to adjusted total income. The financial sav-
ings rate is defined as the ratio of financial savings to adjusted total income. The
operational savings rate eliminates compensation for inflation from the financial
savings rate. The investment ratio equals the ratio of household investment spend-
ing, mostly on dwelling and garage construction, to adjusted total income. Adjusted
total disposable income includes transfers in kind and savings in pension funds, in
addition to total income.
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and the rise in outstanding home-building loans both suggest
a further increase in investment spending and in the invest-
ment ratio as well.
The uncertainty of the current forecast is in the lack of his-
torical observations for household consumption growth of
such a massive volume. High incomes, and the resulting in-
crease in consumption, may induce additional inflation, de-
pending on movements in supply conditions. In the Bank’s
view, this effect may be underestimated by the models. This,
in turn, yields a risk which implies a more modest real con-
sumption growth.
II. 1. 4 Corporate investment
Corporate fixed investment is forecast to decline by 1.5-4.5%
in 2002 and increase by 3.5-7.5% in 2003, in accordance with
the surprisingly low actual figures for 2002 Q1 and a slower-
than-expected recovery in external demand. By contrast, for
total investment the projection in both 2002 and 2003 is  higher
than previously assumed, it is around 7% in 2002 and 6% in
2003. The upward revision to the May projection is primarily
due to higher-than-expected expansion in state projects, in
addition to the assumption of stronger housing-related invest-
ment, consistent with increased household incomes.
There is considerable uncertainty surrounding the assess-
ment of actual data on corporate investment.15 The rate of cor-
porate investment growth in 2001 Q4 implied that the invest-
ment slump had reached its lowest level. This assessment was
supported by evidence of improving business prospects and
expectations of higher capacity utilisation in the sector (see
previous Report). Hence, the May projection was for a continu-
ously rising corporate investment profile.
Contrary to this expectation, the level of corporate invest-
ment fell sharply in 2002 Q1, involving a sharper-than-average
fall in manufacturing investment This new information has also
revised the judgement of the data for 2001 Q4, and it is no
longer clear when investment bottomed out.
Despite the decline in investment by firms, whole economy
investment grew faster in 2002 Q1 than previously. This was
primarily due to a 38% increase in state projects, including a
28% rise in investment, excluding motorway construction.
Households continued to expand their investments by over
10%, reflecting an unbroken boom in the housing market.
Corporate fixed investment is assumed to increase more
slowly than projected previously. The downward revision of
the growth rate reflects the Bank’s modest expectations of ex-
ternal demand, in addition to the actual data for Q1. Moreover,
accurately assessing the state of the Hungarian business cycle
has become significantly more difficult than it was three
months ago (see section on Output). In contrast, there is also
a growing evidence of a prospective pickup in corporate in-
Chart II-5. Number of building permits and
completions
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15 The value for corporate fixed investment has been estimated by the Bank. The
Central Statistical Office only reports full-year investment data for the corporate
sector as a whole. In the Bank’s methodology, the category of fixed investment
does not include investment projects linked to motorway construction, treating these
as state projects, in contrast with the CSO’s treatment.
Chart II-6. Revision of corporate fixed investment
data
(Annualised quarter-on-quarter change, seasonally ad-
justed)
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Chart II-7. Corporate, state and household
investment
(1995 = 100)
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vestment. First, investment imports continued to gain momen-
tum during Q2. It is unclear, however, what share of this im-
port growth is accounted for by the non-corporate sector. Sec-
ond, data from a Kopint-Datorg survey on capacity utilisation
suggest that for the first time since late 2000, capacity utilisation
began to increase in Q2. The upward trend is also reinforced
by expectations of rising capacity utilisation. Nevertheless, it
is difficult to judge the utilisation level that is likely to induce
firms to start expanding capacities. All in all, corporate invest-
ment is forecast to shrink by roughly 1.5-4.5% in 2002, and to
turn up at a robust rate  between 3.5-7.5% in 2003, subject to a
recovery in external activity.
The Bank’s previous projection for total investment has been
revised upwards. In contrast to lower growth in the corporate
sector, investment is projected to increase markedly in the
public and household sectors. We believe that over the short
term, it will be possible to maintain the strong first-quarter
growth in both sectors. This assumption is supported by the
robust pace of capital goods imports in Q1 and rapid growth
in construction output. Over the longer term, investment ex-
penditure in respect of public-sector projects is assumed to be
consistent with budgetary guidelines, but the investment pro-
jection for 2003 does not yet reflect a drastic decline, since
there is a lag between the provision of funds and the actual
completion of the projects. Hence, public sector investment is
projected to grow by 20-25% in 2002 and around 0% in 2003
(see section on General Government). Household investment
is expected to expand in line with the evolution of household
income, producing volume indices of 20-25% in 2002 and 10-
15% in 2003 (see section on Household Consumption).
Based on the above assumptions, total investment is pro-
jected to increase by 7.0% in 2002 and 6.0% in 2003.
II. 1. 5 Inventory investment
Assessing firms’ inventory investment efforts may be of the
greatest help in forecasting business activity. This is because
the fastest way for firms to respond to changes in output and
sales prospects is by altering the level of stocks. Hence, a shift
in the level of inventories can serve as a leading indicator of
changes in the cyclical position.16 It has been frequently pointed
out in previous Reports that a cyclical upswing is expected to
encourage the replenishment of currently low inventory lev-
els, leading to an increase in stocks (with special regard to in-
put stocks). However, first-quarter GDP data suggest that stocks
were cut significantly during the period. Nevertheless, in addi-
tion to GDP statistics, there are two further statistics available
for studying inventories.17
Chart II-8. Current and expected capacity
utilisation in manufacturing
(KOPINT survey)
Chart II-9. Corporate fixed investment and capital
goods imports
(Annualised quarter-on-quarter change, seasonally ad-
justed)
Chart II-10. Forecasts of corporate fixed investment
and external demand
(Annualised quarter-on-quarter change, seasonally ad-
justed)
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16 The inventories section of the February Report’s Special Topics assesses the cor-
relation between inventories and the business cycle. Another useful article on the
subject has been published in the ECB Monthly Bulletin, giving an analysis of busi-
ness cycles within the EU in the 1990s. One of the conclusions of the study is that
change in stocks functions as a good leading indicator of the state of the business
cycle within the EU, as it moves in parallel, preceding it by a three-month period. In
a long-term view the Hungarian economy is also characterised by pro-cyclicality of
inventories.
17 On the difference between inventory statistics and the related methodological
difficulties, refer to Chapter 9 in the Handbook on the Use of Hungarian Economic
Data (forthcoming) and the Special Topics section in the February Report.
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Within the inventory statistics compiled by the Central Sta-
tistical Office, whole economy inventories are classified into
three main categories, namely manufacturing input stocks
(40%), manufacturing output stocks (30%) and commercial in-
put stocks (20%). It seems worthwhile to start by looking at
the ratios of these components to output.
The ratios of both manufacturing input stocks and stocks of
finished goods to output have followed a similar course re-
cently. Interestingly enough, there is no evidence of any inten-
tional accumulation of inventories, neither in respect of input
nor output stocks prevalent in manufacturing at the time of
the Russian crisis. At the same time, there has been a conspicu-
ous flattening in the past few years’ downward trend of the
inventories to output ratio (associated with better stock-build-
ing efficiency), with even an upturn in the inventory ratios.
The rise in the ratio of finished goods stocks to output seen
since late 2000 signals prolonged sales difficulties. On the other
hand, the first-quarter upsurge in input stocks may be associ-
ated with a better outlook for production. The ratio of trade
input stocks to retail turnover moved in an opposite direction
to that of manufacturing inventories. The long-term trend was
upward in respect of trade inventories, but when retail trade
picked up from late 2000, the ratio started to decrease. On the
whole, the Statistical Office’s inventory statistics reveal an up-
turn in whole-economy inventories in 2002 Q1, confirming the
Bank’s perception of inventory growth.
An analysis of the composition of industrial output stocks18
provides further information on the state of the business cycle.
When activity began to slow in late 2000, stocks of investment
goods were the first to react, beginning to fall off as early as
the start of 2001. By contrast, stocks of intermediary goods
piled up due to slower production and only started to fall in
the second half of 2001. The increase in manufacturing output
stocks over this period was the result of rising food invento-
ries. By contrast, the contribution of foodstuffs to inventory
growth during the first six months of this year lost momen-
tum, simultaneously with rising inventories in respect of in-
vestment and intermediary goods. This type of manufacturing
output stock growth also indicates a cyclical upturn.
II. 1. 6 External trade
Hungary’s GDP-based exports of goods and services are ex-
pected to grow by around 5% in 2002 and by 7.8% in 2003,
somewhat below the forecasts published in the May Report.
This is explained mainly by the expected more subdued growth
in external demand. In contrast, imports have risen in line with
the Bank’s earlier forecast – inward trade will likely grow by
8.6% in 2002 and by 8.7% in 2003, due to the revision to a num-
ber of components of domestic absorption relative to the pre-
vious forecast.
Following the cyclical downturn in the previous year, ex-
ports and imports both rose unexpectedly sharply in 2002 Q1.
This cannot not be explained by the continued fall in external
18 The composition of the output stocks is estimated using industrial statistics re-
ported by the Statistical Office. Production of final use less sales figures at current
prices is taken as an indicator of change in finished goods stocks.
Chart II-11. Manufacturing and trade inventory
ratios at current prices
Chart II-12. Changes in the components of
manufacturing output stocks
(At current prices, million forints)
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demand. Rather the salient growth rate was driven by the up-
turn in performance of a firm registering high-volume exports
and imports in the period under review. So the paths of do-
mestic exports and imports showed a one-off shift upwards,
despite the prolonged external cyclical downturn. But second-
quarter customs statistics suggest that the growth rates of Hun-
garian foreign trade are adjusting to the external demand path,
with a genuine upturn being expected only in 2002 H2.
In 2002 H2, Hungarian goods exports are expected to re-
flect strongly the effects of last year’s real exchange rate appre-
ciation. Consequently, the Bank’s forecast of export growth is
now a little lower, even despite the high growth rate recorded
in Q1. In 2003, the full-year effect of 2002’s real appreciation
will be reflected in developments in exports, in addition to
the pick-up in external demand. However, a slightly more rapid
annual increase in exports is expected on the low 2002 base
relative to the forecast in the May Report.
Imports of goods are likely to grow rapidly in 2002, driven
by the high growth rate of domestic absorption. Although this
expected growth in imports may seem to be less solidly based
from the perspective of output, the indicators of inventories
most closely linked to cyclical developments suggest growing
business activity, so imports may grow more robustly. The
strong upturn in the external business cycle will likely keep
imports on a high growth path in 2003, despite the expected
moderation of domestic absorption. On the whole, although
the pick-up in the business cycle is still suffering a delay, the
contribution of net exports to economic growth are likely to
be negative in 2002, in contrast with earlier years. This is ex-
pected to continue, although at a slowing pace, supported by
a pick-up in external demand in 2003.
Considering services, the prolonged weakness of external
demand is affecting the revenue side of tourism the most – in
contrast with the earlier forecast, the Bank currently does not
expect revenue to grow in 2002. But in 2003 the pick-up may
be even stronger relative to the forecast in the May Report.
However, expenditure, which tend to be closely aligned with
developments in household income, is expected to grow
strongly in 2002, followed by a more modest increase in 2003.
Growth in imports of other services is expected to be more
robust than that in exports in 2002, similarly to the expected
pattern of goods trade, although the gap between the growth
rates will likely narrow, due to the stronger increase in exports.
II. 1. 7 External balance
Hungary’s current account deficit is now forecast to be EUR 3
billion in 2002 and EUR 3.1 billion in 2003, amounting to  4.4%
and 4,2% of GDP , higher than estimated in the May Report.
The 2.5 per cent rise relative to the previous year in the ex-
ternal financing requirement in 2002 as a proportion of GDP,
is due to the fact that fiscal expansion has exerted upward pres-
sure on the general government financing requirement. House-
hold disposable income is rising but consumption expendi-
ture and investment spending increase even faster, reducing
household financing capacity. Firms’ financing requirement
will be smaller this year despite a drop in the sector’s dispos-
able income, due to real appreciation and sluggish labour
Chart II-13 Forecasts of external demand, exports
and imports
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market adjustment, as there will be even more pronounced
restraint on investment spending.
The year 2003 is not likely to witness another rise in the ex-
ternal financing requirement . This is because the general gov-
ernment financing requirement falls by 2,5% of GDP, in accor-
dance with the path designated by the medium-term fiscal
programme. The large-scale contraction of fiscal demand will
not lead to a major drop in the external financing requirement,
because the private sector’s net position is expected to dete-
riorate. The reduction of the general government deficit will
affect corporate sector incomes, as the budget will maintain
its expansionary stance vis-ŕ-vis the household sector in 2003,
due to the full effect of the decisions passed earlier.  House-
holds’ net saving position falls slightly as a proportion of GDP,
explained by stronger investment spending. Consistent with
the business cycle, firms will step up investment already this
year, which is expected to exert upward pressure on their fi-
nancing requirement.
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II. 2 Output
The Bank has revised down its forecast of manufacturingvalue added relative to the earlier assumption. Accordingly,
growth in value added is expected to be between 0-1% in 2002
and 5,5-8,5% in 2003. Two factors has prompted the revision to
the earlier forecast. The first is the slower-than-expected rise in
external demand. The second, reinforced by actual data for Q1,
is that growth will likely be lower than forecast earlier. How-
ever, gross output in manufacturing rose above expectations
in the first five months of the year, in which factors indepen-
dent of the business cycle may probably have played a role.
Assessing the current phase of the business cycle in manu-
facturing now is especially difficult. The fast pick-up in gross
manufacturing output in the early months of the year cannot
be judged as a clear evidence of recovery. First, manufacturing
has not been progressing along a straight line, rather it has been
volatile – following the rise in the first three months, it stag-
nated in April–May. Second, there are no observable signs in
the background of an improvement in the external business
cycle, which makes the lasting recovery uncertain. The expan-
sion of output has been concentrated in a fairly narrow range
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II. Demand and output
of sectors, mostly in a handful of companies in engineering
and the food industry.
The results of business surveys conducted in 2002 Q1 do
no suggest a favourable turn over the short term either. Al-
though the survey by Kopint-Datorg shows an improvement
in the outlook for exports to the EU markets, the prospects for
output and domestic sales have failed to move away from their
bottom reached six months ago. In addition, the GKI business
confidence index have not improved significantly either since
early 2002, fluctuating around the February level in the past
few months. Taking all these factors into account, the Bank
judges the upswing in manufacturing output in Q1 to have
been caused by one-off influences, and expects industrial out-
put to return to the level determined by external demand over
the longer term. This will allow output to grow by 3,5-5,0% in
2002 and by 6,5-9,5% in 2003.
The Bank’s forecast of manufacturing value added is now
lower than that published in the previous Report. Explanation
for this is the worse assessment of external demand and actual
data for 2002 Q1. The rise in gross output in Q1 was stronger
than that in valued added, as seen in the previous quarter. This
phenomenon has been characteristic of cyclical upturns in the
past, which may be explained by a number of reasons. First, it
may be linked to cycle-related fluctuations in intermediate con-
sumption, and particularly in purchased stocks (see the May
Report). Second, it may result from the peculiarities of the do-
mestic business structure. If multinational firms’ activities pick
up relative to those of domestic companies during the recov-
ery phase, then companies producing lower value added will
see their percentage share of gross output rise. Accordingly,
on the assumption that multinational firms continue to account
for a dominant role in Hungarian economic development, the
rate of gross output growth will likely be stronger than growth
in value added during future business upturns.
As currently there is no accurate information explaining the
background of the difference between gross output and value
added, this factor has not been taken into account in forecast-
ing growth in value added. The forecast is based on the as-
sumption that value added will develop in line with turns in
external demand, this translating into increases of 0-1% in 2002
and 5,5-8,5% in 2003.19 This path suggests broadly comparable
growth in value added and gross output. The gap observed
between the rates at which gross output and value added have
grown in the past may be taken into consideration as a risk of
lower growth relative to the central path.
In 2002 Q1, market services rose slightly above the Bank’s
forecast. Higher-than-expected increases in retail trade and
household consumption were the reasons behind this. The
Bank has developed its current forecast of market services value
added on the basis of demand factors. Consistent with the in-
crease in household consumption, the earlier forecast has been
revised down for each two year – market services value added
is now expected to rise around 5% in both 2002 and 2003.
19 The significant difference between the projected indices of gross production and
value added in manufacturing for 2002 may be traced to the actual data. Value added
fell so significantly in the final quarter of 2001 that, even on the assumption of
equal growth rates with those in gross output, manufacturing value added can only
be expected to rise above the previous year’s level in the third quarter of 2002.
Chart II-14. Gross manufacturing output and value
added
(Annualised quarter-on-quarter change, seasonally ad-
justed)
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Chart II-15. Forecasts of manufacturing value
added and external demand
(1995 = 100)
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II. Demand and output
In the current forecast, the rise in market demand is higher
than that in market supply at the entire forecast horizon. In
addition, as it has been noted in the chapter on inventory in-
vestment, stocks are expected to build up, in line with the im-
provement in cyclical conditions. Thus, forecasts of market
demand and supply do not fit properly, for which economic
rationale has not been found. Technically, we can resolve the
contradiction between the two approaches on the ‘Inventory
investment and other non-specified use’ row of GDP, the fore-
cast of which is not consistent with turns in the business cycle,
rather it reflects the different growth rates of the production
and use sides.
Chart II-16. Annual growth in market demand and
supply
(Annualised quarter-on-quarter change, seasonally ad-
justed)
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3 Labour market and competitiveness
As pointed out in earlier Reports, the intensity and speed oflabour market adjustments are crucial from the perspec-
tive of the real economic costs of disinflation. With forward-
looking, flexible wage-setting practices, disinflation should not
entail significant growth sacrifices, as businesses can adjust to
the lower inflation environment without suffering large income
losses. With a backward-looking, inflexible wage-setting mecha-
nism, however, the costs of labour will be relatively higher,
possibly leading to declines in employment and output.
The Bank’s current projection is for a different labour mar-
ket profile than in May, due to a number of factors. One of the
reasons for revising the forecast for 2002 is that actual data on
the past few months reflect a higher rate of wage inflation than
previously projected. The Bank has also changed its estimates
about cyclical activity, with the forecast for external demand
revised down and that for domestic demand revised up. It is a
crucial change that, at the Monetary Council’s request, the cur-
rent forecast for 2003 assumes low private sector wage growth,
as indicated by the Government’s medium-term economic
policy programme.
Second-quarter data suggest that there has not yet been a
significant decline in manufacturing wage inflation, where the
nominal exchange rate should exert its disciplinary effect most
strongly, according to the Bank’s expectations. Wage inflation
in manufacturing has been flat to falling, whereas employment
in the sector has been on a steady decline for quite a long time,
due in part to cyclical reasons. Service sector wage inflation
stagnated at high levels, with rising employment in 2002 Q2,
accompanied by lively domestic demand.20
The Bank’s earlier forecasts were based on the assumption
that, one year after the band widening, more pronounced signs
of nominal adjustment should appear. Hence, nominal wage
growth was expected to slow significantly in 2002, particularly
in the second half of the year. Taking into account the actual
data released since the band widening and the latest model
results, the Bank currently judges that wage adjustment may
be slower and longer lasting than previously expected, reflect-
ing lower-than-expected flexibility within the Hungarian labour
market.21 This suggests that the negative effect on employment
will likely be higher than previously expected.
20 For a detailed description of the content of labour market indicators and the
treatment of time series, refer to Section 15 of the Handbook on the Use of Hungar-
ian Economic Statistics, NBH (forthcoming), http://www.mnb.hu/.
21 See Section V. 1.
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Due to the above factors, in the current central projection,
wage growth is faster and the reduction in employed numbers
is higher than forecast in the previous Report.
The Bank’s calculations for 2003 are based on the assump-
tion that gross wages would be increased at a subdued rate in
the private sector as prescribed by the Government’s medium
term economic policy programme. The substance of the con-
sideration that at wage negotiations, employees will also take
account of the projected 3.5 percentage point faster growth in
net wages relative to gross wages. This may open the possibil-
ity for employees to agree to wage settlements reflecting a rea-
sonable rate of real net wage growth based on low gross wage
increases.
III. 1 Employment
In the second quarter of 2002, labour market trends indicatedsome changes, since the ratio of activity and the rate of em-
ployment showed flat to slightly upward tendencies, while in-
activity diminished. But there are no changes in the view of
unemployment, as the unemployment rate remained flat.
(However, the changes were within the limits of sampling er-
rors. Therefore, it needs caution to draw conclusions from
that.)22
Monthly employment statistics suggest that in 2002 Q2
manufacturing employment continued on the downward trend
witnessed since late 2000.23 The Bank staff believe that, in ad-
dition to cyclical conditions in the sector, the drop in numbers
employed was also due to the high rate of wage inflation. At-
tributed to robust growth in  demand, cyclical activity in the
service sector is significantly better, which is also reflected by
a steady pick-up in  employed numbers.
The first-half decline in manufacturing employment was
roughly equal to that assumed in the previous Report. At the
same time, the latest data do not reflect any considerable slow-
down in wage inflation, and labour use is also not rising in
intensity. At the same time, the new projection is for a weaker
external demand profile than assumed previously. The combi-
nation of these trends suggest that the drop in manufacturing
employment in the second six months of 2002 will likely be
higher than assumed in the previous Report. In 2003, an im-
provement in external business activity and an assumed de-
cline of wage inflation is expected to exert some upward pres-
sure on the numbers employed in manufacturing, as projected
earlier (due to the base effect, however, the annual index will
continue to fall slightly).
In the first half of 2002, service sector employment grew at
a somewhat weaker rate than previously projected, presum-
ably due to faster-than-expected wage growth and the fact that
the minimum wage rise early in the year had a stronger nega-
tive effect than expected. As domestic cyclical activity is ex-
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Chart III-1. Labour market indicators*
*Labour Force Survey of the Central Statistical Office. De-
rived from seasonally adjusted data.
Chart III-2.  Changes in the numbers of full-time
employees*
* Seasonally adjusted data, recalculated statistically for busi-
nesses employing over five people. Source of original data
is the Central Statistical Office. Actual data available until
May are complemented by data for June estimated using
statistical methods.
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22 Based on the Labour Force Survey.
23 Based on institutional labour statistics. As actual data are available only for the
period until May, data on June needed for the second-quarter analysis have been
estimated using statistical methods.
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pected to remain buoyant, service sector employment is pro-
jected to grow at a balanced pace both in 2002 and 2003.
On the whole, the central projections assume that private
sector employment will decline in 2002 (-0.6%) and expand
slightly in 2003 (+0.4%).
III. 2 Labour reserves and tightness
Firms initially adjusted to the movements in the businesscycle by changing the intensity of labour usage. The inten-
sity of labour usage is measured in terms of the average num-
ber of hours worked. The number of average manufacturing
hours worked by the manual labour force fell sharply in 2001,
followed by a reversal in 2002 Q1, similar to that reflected by
other indicators associated with movements in the business
cycle. However, data for the second quarter did not support
this change in trends, showing renewed drops in the intensity
of labour usage.24
The economy finds reserves for extensive expansion prima-
rily in the unemployed labour force (and certain inactive sec-
tions of the population). The proportion of unemployed
people within the economically active remained virtually flat
from mid-2001 and during the first half of 2002.25
In 2002 Q2, there was no significant change in the number
of reported mass layoffs, in a quarter-on-quarter comparison.26
Incidentally, the number of redundancies announced for any
given three months has moved within a relatively narrow range
for quite a while, except for two high values reported in the
first and final quarters of 2001. It is possible that these surges
may be associated with the mandatory increases in minimum
wages, but it should also be noted that assuming usually low
values, this indicator is very sensitive to individual one-off in-
cidents.27
Following a slight upturn in the first quarter, the number of
reported vacancies resumed its downward trend in the second
quarter, consistent with the path observed since early 2000.
Hence, the private sector is more likely to face excess ca-
pacities than tightness in 2002 and 2003, just as in the previ-
ous projection. At the same time, some tightness in certain sec-
tors and areas may still appear, which may have an impact on
wage inflation.
III. 3 Wage inflation
In the first half of 2002, the private sector exhibited no signsof substantial nominal adjustment to a lower inflation envi-
ronment. In the manufacturing sector, which is assumed to face
the strongest need to adjust, wage inflation was in the range of
24 Actual data are available until May, while the data for June have been estimated
using statistical methods.
25 Based on the  Labour Force Survey.
26 Source of actual data for the period until May is the Employment Office. The data
for June have been estimated using statistical methods.
27 2001 Q4, for instance, saw major layoffs by a plant in South Hungary, followed by
new recruitment of an approximately equal measure.
Chart  III-3.  Average weekly hours worked by
manual workers in manufacturing*
* Data for the hours worked are seasonally adjusted and
recalculated statistically for businesses employing over five
people. Source of original data: Central Statistical Office.
The actual data available until May are complemented by
data for June estimated using statistical methods.
Chart  III-4. Reported vacancies and mass layoffs
*Data reported for the individual quarters and the number
of people affected are seasonally adjusted. Source of the
original data is the Employment Office. As the number of
people affected by collective redundancies is only available
for the period until May, the figures for June have been es-
timated using statistical methods.
36.0
36.2
36.4
36.6
36.8
37.0
37.2
37.4
37.6
37.8
38.0
9
5
:Q
1
9
5
:Q
3
9
6
:Q
1
9
6
:Q
3
9
7
:Q
1
9
7
:Q
3
9
8
:Q
1
9
8
:Q
3
9
9
:Q
1
9
9
:Q
3
0
0
:Q
1
0
0
:Q
3
0
1
:Q
1
0
1
:Q
3
0
2
:Q
1
H
ou
rs
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
9
5
:Q
1
9
5
:Q
3
9
6
:Q
1
9
6
:Q
3
9
7
:Q
1
9
7
:Q
3
9
8
:Q
1
9
8
:Q
3
9
9
:Q
1
9
9
:Q
3
0
0
:Q
1
0
0
:Q
3
0
1
:Q
1
0
1
:Q
3
0
2
:Q
1
Th
ou
sa
n d
s
o f
pe
op
le
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Th
ou
sa
nd
s
of
pe
op
le
Number of reported vacancies Mass layoffs
37AUGUST 2002 • QUARTERLY REPORT OF INFLATION
III. Labour market and competitivennes
12-13% in the second quarter, continuing its flat to falling trend
seen in the past twelve months. Following some acceleration
early in the year, wages in the sector of market services re-
mained flat at approximately 14.5% in Q2, in terms of the
annualised quarter-on-quarter index.28
Wage inflation in the second quarter was higher than pro-
jected in previous reports both in the service sector and in
manufacturing. As far as market services are concerned, this
could be attributed to domestic demand being more robust
than expected.
The Bank’s earlier projections for the manufacturing sec-
tor have been based on the assumption that one year after
the widening of the exchange rate band, the exporting sec-
tor should start showing some clear signs of nominal adjust-
ment, due to deteriorating profitability. However, the actual
data for 2002 Q2 fail to confirm this expectation. The Bank’s
previous Report features an at-length discussion of a number
of hypotheses that may explain the continued high rate of
wage inflation (such as the effect of relative wage levels,
labour market bottlenecks, the effects of the minimum wage
rise and the balance sheet channel). The Bank staff continue
to believe that one of these hypotheses, either alone or in
combination with each other, may offer a plausible explana-
tion for the delay in nominal adjustment.
At the same time, the Bank’s views on short-term wage ad-
justment have been refined by the findings of a company
questionnaire survey29. The survey findings suggest that for
over two-thirds of firms short-term adjustment to weaker ex-
port profitability involved an exploration of production re-
serves or shifts in market orientation, rather than cutting back
on wage growth. Similarly, the Bank’s own simulation results
refer to a slower than earlier expected wage adjustment.30
Hence, for 2002 the current projection assumes a slower
and more protracted path for wage adjustment than the pre-
vious Report. Thus, considering the uncertainty in the labour
market processes the prediction for the wage inflation within
the private sector as a whole is between 12.4% and 13.6% in
2002. At approximately 13%, the central projection for wage
growth in 2002 is 1.8 percentage points higher than in the
previous Report. This comprises slightly lower rates of wage
increases in both major sectors for the rest of the year, amount-
ing to roughly 12% in manufacturing and 13.9% in the sector
of market services, for the year as a whole.
In accordance with the Government’s medium-term eco-
nomic policy programme, the Bank staff reckon with private
sector wages to increase at a subdued rate in 2003. The sub-
stance of the assumption is that wage settlements next year
will also take account of the predicted faster growth in net
wages compared to gross wages. This may pave the way for
wage settlements allowing low gross wage increases, while
28 Based on actual data for the period until May and estimates calculated using sta-
tistical methods for June.
29 The Effect of Widening the Exchange Rate Band – Findings of a Follow-up Study,
Economic Research Institute of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Indus-
try, Budapest, June 2002.
30 See The exchange rate pass-through to domestic prices – model calculations in the
section Special Topics.
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ensuring net real growth that employees are also willing to
accept.
The Bank’s calculations for 2003 are based on the estima-
tion that the difference between the rates of net and gross wage
growth amounts to 3.5 percentage points. In the projection,
set out from the Government’s medium term strategy, the Bank
staff assume that firms will raise gross nominal wages by 3% in
the course of the year, which corresponds to a net nominal
wage increase of 6.5%, taking into account the widening gap
between the growth rates of gross and net wages. Considering
the full-year (statistical) effects of wage increases implemented
last year and this year, this rise may lead to average annual gross
wage inflation in the range of 4-5%, depending on the timing
within the year.31
In the Bank’s estimate, just as in 2001, average labour costs
(per employee) will rise at a roughly 1.5 percentage point
slower rate than wage inflation in 2002, due to a reduction in
social security contributions paid by employers on gross
wages.32 As no similar change is expected to affect the cost items
additional to gross wages in 2003, average labour costs are as-
sumed to increase at the same rate as wage inflation.
In the central projection the growth rate of nominal unit
labour costs (ULC) fall by roughly 2.5 percentage points in
2002, (from 10.1% last year to 7.6%).33 The projection for 2003,
based on the fulfilment of the Government’s medium-term
economic policy program-me, is for considerably falling ULC
in manufacturing (down by 2.4%) and a moderate growth in
respect of market services, with the combined rate slightly de-
creasing.
III. 4 Productivity and
competitiveness
Regarding manufacturing competitiveness, we project aslightly more depreciated real exchange rate path, than in
our previous Report. In the second half of 2002 - due to the
increase in manufacturing value added - the tendency of real
appreciation turns to real depreciation, although attributable
to the high level in the previous year, the annual index still
shows significant, 9.5% appreciation. In 2003 - assuming, that
private sector gross wages increase at a more restrained pace,
as proposed by the Government’s medium-term strategy - a
3.5% depreciation is projected.
Chart III-5. Projection for unit labour costs*
(Annualised quarter-on-quarter change, seasonally ad-
justed)
* Seasonally adjusted data, with the change smoothed by a
three-term moving average.
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Chart III-6. The level of the unit labour cost based
real exchange rate in manufacturing
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 Chart III-7. Productivity in manufacturing
(Annualised quarter-on-quarter change, seasonally ad-
justed)
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31 If a time series contains a rise in a given year, this may keep annual indices at a
high rate in the subsequent year, even in the absence of further rises. Accordingly,
full-year effects reflected in twelve-month average aggregate wage indices arise pre-
dominantly because the individual wage increases are not implemented at the start
of the year and on an identical date. Non-regular pay, such as bonuses, rewards, etc,
has a similar effect.
32 In addition to gross wages, labour costs also comprise other costs incurred by
employers, including employers’ contributions and taxes paid in respect of their
employees, and additional benefits (such as benefits in kind, social benefits, meal
discounts, commuting cost and retraining reimbursement, etc.).
33 Estimates for the level of average labour costs have been revised down on the
basis of the Central Statistical Office’s labour cost survey conducted in 2000. The
revision has brought the level of unit labour costs of the past few years to a lower
level than earlier estimated.  Therefore, the level of the unit labour cost based real
exchange rate in manufacturing became more depreciated in the years referred to
than earlier estimated.
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III. Labour market and competitivennes
The 2002 Q1 manufacturing productivity figure was basi-
cally in line with our expectations. Following the massive de-
cline in 2001 Q4, productivity turned strongly upwards in 2002
Q1. This underscored the Bank’s earlier view that the decline
preceding the recovery must have been attributable to tempo-
rary shocks. However, the recovery turned out to be some
1 percentage point weaker than expected (see the chapter on
output). The outturn for increase in wage costs more or less
met the forecast. Taken together, the rise in unit labour costs
turned out to be 1.5 percentage points higher than previously
expected.34,35
As mentioned previously, for 2002 our projection includes
the assumption of a more prolonged wage adjustment than in
our previous Report, while for 2003 - according to the request
of the Monetary council - we assume a very moderate wage
increase in the private sector. (see the chapter on labour mar-
ket developments). At the same time, due to the rebound in
external demand, manufacturing productivity is now fore-
casted to rise, so the rate of growth of manufacturing unit
labour costs are moderating in 2002, while in 2003 a decline
of 2.4% is projected. The real depreciation due to the declin-
ing unit labour costs from the end of 2002 is further reinforced
by a some 4 HUF weaker exchange rate relative to the previ-
ous Report.
In terms of the price-based competitiveness indicators, the
CPI-based real exchange rate has continued to appreciate more
significantly than the manufacturing price-based real exchange
rate. The major reason behind this is that the nominal exchange
rate appreciation, which started in 2001, has fed through to
manufacturing prices more rapidly than to the CPI exclusively
containing tradables. In the current forecast, disinflation is
slower in 2003 than expected earlier; however, the higher ef-
fect of the CPI is offset by a weaker exchange rate relative to
the earlier projection. On the whole, the Bank expects the forint
exchange rate to be at a less appreciated level by the end of
2003 than previously projected.
Chart III-8 Price based real exchange rate
indicators
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34   The Bank’s current forecast reflects the result of revision to actual data.
35 As national accounts data are only available up to 2002 Q1, the last actual data for
unit labour costs refer to this period. Naturally our analyses of the latest develop-
ments refer to 2002Q1, despite labour market data being available for the period
up to 2002 Q2.
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IV. 1 International economic
environment and risk perception
The European Central Bank has not changed its key ratesince November 2001. Market participants have expected
an interest rate hike on several occasions, prompted by both
the economic developments and certain official ECB state-
ments. As the economic indicators have not painted a clear
picture of economic prospects in either the USA or Europe,
the ECB took its time (see Chart IV-1). The April rate of infla-
tion published in May was higher than expected (2.4% instead
of 2.2%), due primarily to some energy price increases. The
expectations of a rate hike eased in the course of June and
July, as inflation in the euro area fell to 2% in May, and then to
1.8% in June, i.e. within the ECB’s official medium-term toler-
ance range. The slowdown in inflation can broadly be attrib-
uted to weaker increases in unprocessed food prices, a drop
in energy prices and the strengthening of the euro.
In May, the euro started to strengthen against the dollar, with
the monthly average exchange rate up from 0.88 dollarcents
in April to 0.917 dollarcents in May and 0.955 in June, approxi-
mating parity during the final days of June. In the course of
July, the exchange rate fluctuated between 0.97 and 1.02
dollarcents. Experience of recent years suggests that European
economic activity depend to a great extent on global economic
developments, which, in turn, are essentially subject to the
performance of the US and the Asian region, with special re-
gard to Japan. The fact that any pickup in global recovery is
expected to come later than the second half of 2002 as assumed
earlier also sets a restraint on a European recovery. This uncer-
tain situation makes it unlikely that the euro strengthened
against the dollar due to an improvement in European eco-
nomic prospects relative to the US. Rather, the euro must have
gained momentum due to rising distrust of dollar investments,
arising from uncertainty about the reliability of financial state-
ments of US firms, in addition to a burgeoning US trade deficit
and weak corporate profitability. In particular, a new wave of
corporate financial difficulties emerging in the summer cre-
ated an atmosphere of general distrust about the credibility of
the financial accounting practices of large American listed com-
panies. This confidence crisis not only plagued the American
stock markets, but also their European and Asian counterparts,
pushing down the indexes to a level last seen at the time of the
terrorist attacks in September 2001. Thus, the uncertainty about
a cyclical recovery also grew outside the US, in nearly every
economic region.
IV. Monetary developments
Chart IV-1 The ECB’s main refinancing rate and
euro area short term market yield
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IV. Monetary developments
Prompted by the financial troubles facing US corporations,
financial market investors cut their dollar-denominated invest-
ments, mainly transferring the resulting free funds  into euro-
denominated securities and, to a lesser extent, into Asian in-
struments. The steady net capital outflow from the euro area
primarily to the US, seen between 1999 and 2001, seemed to
turn around and this capital inf low caused the euro to
strengthen. If this appreciation of the euro proves to be a last-
ing trend, the resulting tighter monetary conditions and the
prospective drop in energy prices due to the weakening of the
dollar will cause inflation to decline further in the euro area,
contributing to a fall or reversal in interest rate expectations.
Finally, should global economic recovery occur later and/or
be less robust than expected, this may also contribute to a fall
in interest rate expectations.
The yield on securities issued in the Hungarian currency
contains a risk premium. A portion of this premium is gov-
erned by external – global and regional – factors. Several of
these external factors have changed for the worse since the
publication of the May Report. No solution to the Argentinean
financial crisis is in sight, and the situation was further aggra-
vated by the resignation of the central bank governor. There
have also been adverse shifts in previously stable investor sen-
timent towards other Latin American markets, including Bra-
zil. The publication in May of first quarter Brazilian GDP, the
nearly 10% depreciation of the currency and the modest per-
formance of US companies active in the country have also
caused a fall-off in the largest stock market of the continent,
questioning the country’s  international solvency. The gloomier
perception of Brazil had an immediate effect on other Latin
American countries.  Meanwhile, the economic crisis in Tur-
key may be accompanied by a government crisis as well. News
about preparations for renewed terrorist attacks continues to
foster global uncertainty, with the possibility of a Middle East
settlement fading as well. These developments are all reflected
in the sharp rise of the EMBI index, which gauges investor
demand for emerging country sovereign bonds, since late May
(see Chart IV-2). In addition to the worsening perception of
emerging markets, uncertainties about more advanced areas
have also increased. From May 2002, the date of a cyclical re-
covery in developed countries has drifted into the more dis-
tant future, due to the financial turmoil about US companies.
These factors have cut demand for risky investments, which
was clearly rising at the time of the previous Report, and this
downturn has also exerted upward pressure on the risk pre-
mia. Global risk indicators have returned to the peak levels
measured last September (see Chart IV-2).
In respect of Central and Eastern Europe, certain trends in
countries listed in the same class as Hungary with respect to
the EU accession and joining EMU, as well as related news have
also pushed up the risk premium on the forint. The fall in the
exchange rate of the Polish currency, due to external and do-
mestic imbalances, the finance minister’s resignation and the
new minister’s hints about prospective devaluation of the zloty
have repeatedly weakened the forint’s exchange rate. Initial
statements by the new Czech minister of finance indicated
moderate ambitions about early participation in monetary
union, due to the fiscal policy implications of adopting the
euro. However, the exchange rate of the Czech koruna has not
Chart IV-2 Global risk indicators
* S&P U.S. Industrial Speculative Grade Credit Index
**S&P100 index option implied volatility
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been weakened by either country-specific or external events,
steady, powerful capital inflows largely associated with ongo-
ing privatisation.
International investors have interpreted the Polish and Czech
developments as signs of these countries’ intentions to postpone
joining the EMU by a few years (from the early dates of 2006 or
2007 in case of the Czech Republic). As these investors list Hun-
gary together with the Czech Republic and Poland in respect of
both the EU and EMU enlargement, it cannot be ruled out that
they have interpreted the changing sentiments in the two coun-
tries as also bearing on the date of Hungarian membership.
Perception of risk in Hungarian investments has been clearly
affected by some country-specific factors since May. The ad-
verse factors have included a number of domestic macroeco-
nomic developments, in particular the rising budget deficit,
the weaker-than-expected external balance, the amendment to
the Central Bank Act and transitory uncertainties surrounding
the timing of EMU accession. Developments of this kind have
caused the forint exchange rate to weaken and the yields on
government securities to rise. The downward shift in the forint
exchange rate was only interrupted when the Government
passed a medium-term economic policy strategy for the com-
ing years, aimed at fiscal consolidation and rapid EMU acces-
sion (for a detailed discussion of this, see sections IV.2 and
IV.3).
The spread on Hungarian foreign currency bonds issued
earlier in Deutsch Mark fell by nearly 10 basis points between
April and end-May, returning to its early-April level after May
(see Chart IV-3). The current value of less than 50 basis points
still appears to be low, especially as it only slightly exceeds the
spreads of EMU members falling within the range of 10 to 40
basis points, and is far less than the 90-120 basis point spread
for Greece prior to joining the euro area. Thus, the country-
specific risk factors did not so much mar the perception of
Hungary’s  default risk as the increased uncertainty about the
forint exchange rate.
IV. 2 Interest rate and exchange rate
developments
Since 19 February 2002, the Bank has tightened monetaryconditions on two occasions. On May 22, the base rate was
raised from 8.5% to 9%, and then on July 9 by another 50 basis
points to 9.5%. Although April inflation data were unfavourable,
in accordance with its forward looking inflation targeting strat-
egy, this was not the primary factor at work behind the Bank’s
decision to raise the base rate in May. Rather, the main reason
was that the expansion of domestic aggregate demand, such
as fiscal loosening, and high private sector wage growth, and
external factors, such as imported inflation and oil prices, led
to an upward revision of the Bank’s inflation projection. These
factors caused long-term yields to rise and the exchange rate
to weaken. Hence, the tightening was necessitated by the need
to meet the Bank’s inflation target. From early June, increases
in the risk premium on forint investments have also been added
to the domestic factors, exerting downward pressure on the
exchange rate and inducing another interest rate rise.
Chart IV-3. Average spread on DEM-denominated
Hungarian sovereign bonds
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IV. Monetary developments
The market was not surprised by the rate increases as indi-
cated by the fact that the rise in three-month benchmark yields
preceded the central bank measures on both occasions (see
Chart IV-4). Due to rising forint yields and relatively stable euro
yields, the interest rate differential with the euro area opened
up again, from approximately 500 basis points to its current
level of over 600 basis points (see Chart IV-5).
The two indicators customarily reflecting market interest rate
expectations have failed to provide unambiguous information
about the expected course of central bank rates. Reuters’ latest
survey conducted on July 18 suggests that analysts expect the
current rate to last through late August and to slightly edge
down before the end of the year. Nevertheless, the positive
slope of the three-month implied forward yield curve, observ-
able over the short-term section of the yield curve since May,
is still there, indicating expectations of an interest rate increase
of another 25 basis points before the year-end (see Chart IV-6).
The exchange rate of the forint vis-á-vis the euro has dis-
played greater variability in the period since the previous Re-
port, and especially in July, with the end-July rate being on the
whole roughly 0.5% more depreciated than in early May (see
Chart IV-7). The central bank tightening on May 21 success-
fully interrupted the weakening trend. However, the forint/euro
exchange rate started to weaken again in mid-June. The forint
sank by over 2% in the course of two days around July 3. The
factors to blame for the sharp drop included several adverse
pieces of information published simultaneously on domestic
macroeconomic indicators (high budget deficit, dynamic
growth of domestic consumption, widening current account
deficit) and external developments. The interest rate hike on
July 9 was not capable of halting the weakening of the exchange
rate on its own. However, subsequent news on the Govern-
ment’s medium-term macroeconomic strategy containing a
good deal of fiscal consolidation and a much better-than-ex-
pected inflation data caused the exchange rate to start rising
again and to reach the end-June level of HUF 244-245 in late
July. The latest Reuters survey (of July 18) indicates that mar-
ket analysts expect the rate to edge up before the year-end, in
addition to forecasting steady strengthening by end-2003 (see
Chart IV-8).
IV. 3 Capital flows
Under a narrow-band exchange rate regime, short-termcapital movements are reflected in changes in the cen-
tral bank’s stock of sterilisation instruments, which are used to
stabilise the exchange rate. Under the current inflation target-
ing system, however, the central bank seeks to avoid purchas-
ing foreign currency, thus capital flows are allowed to feed
through to changes in the exchange rate and the commercial
banks’ open positions on their balance sheets. As noted ear-
lier, the central bank’s interest rate increases in late May and
July were preceded by weakening in the exchange rate on both
occasions, although to different degrees. This was also reflected
in the evolution of commercial banks’ open positions on their
balance sheets. The long foreign exchange positions, increased
at a more subdued rate in May, were mainly wound up in June
Chart IV-5. Three-month interest rate differential
vis--vis the euro area
Chart IV-6. Central bank base rate and interest
rate expectations based on the yield curve and
the Reuters poll
Chart IV-7. Exchange rate of the forint
Chart IV-8. Forint exchange rate and analysts’
expectations of future exchange rate movements
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IV. Monetary developments
and opened up again in early July. This indicates that while
the exchange rate weakening in June entailed a major decline
in non-bank participants’ demand for forint, the drop in the
rate in early July did not accompany with significant capital
withdrawal (see Chart IV-9).
The factors contributing to the net increase in forint demand
in April and its falloff in May and June included both interest
rate sensitive and non-sensitive items. In both April and May,
the deficit on the current account of the balance of payments
significantly exceeded the level for last year. The high deficit
in April was offset by an inflow of portfolio capital and a pick-
up in foreign currency corporate lending, but in May both net
portfolio investments and firms’ borrowing in foreign currency
changed in a negative direction. In addition, just as in Q1, the
level of foreign direct investment excluding revenues from
privatisation was also lower than in 2001 (see Table IV-1).36
The drop in net portfolio investment in May was due to a
decline in equity holdings and forint deposits, as non-residents
purchased more government securities in the course of May,
at maturities exceeding one year (see Chart IV-10). In early June,
however, non-residents reduced their government securities
holdings by over HUF 60 billion, as a two-year government
bond and a discount treasury note matured. These maturing
investments were only renewed gradually, and there was an-
other transitory decline in early July arising from uncertain-
ties at the time. Then, non-residents started to increase their
government securities holdings, and in end of July the stock
approached the level seen at end-May. The period since early
May has also seen a shift in the maturity structure of holdings,
with an upsurge in the stock of government bonds for terms
between two to five years and a drop in bonds maturing be-
low two years and over five years. The implication is that the
rise in medium-term yields over the period from May to July
must have been primarily due to shifts in Hungarian investors’
yield expectations.
Firms’ net foreign currency position followed a rather vola-
tile course from March to May, but improved on the whole by
approximately HUF 71 billion. At the same time, there was also
a shift in the structure of net foreign currency lending, as its
overall value fell as a combined result of an increase in domes-
tic foreign currency loans and a reduction in borrowing from
abroad. The key factor behind the fluctuations in the stock of
net foreign currency lending was investments undertaken by
investment funds abroad, which fell by HUF 49 billion in April
and increased by roughly a similar amount of HUF 43 billion
in May. Nevertheless, changes in investment fund investments
only account for about one-third of the drop in net foreign
currency borrowing by the corporate sector as a whole in the
period from March to May. The improvement in the foreign
currency position was also due to the fact that non-financial
corporations’ sustained efforts to repay foreign-currency liabili-
ties from abroad, especially in March and May, were not offset
by a corresponding increase in domestic foreign currency lend-
ing.
36 However, the size of foreign direct investment cannot directly be compared with
the figures for 2001, as from January 2002, intercompany transactions vis-á-vis the
group netting centre have been recorded under inter-company loans.
Chart IV-9. Commercial banks’ open foreign
exchange positions
(excluding the Hungarian Development Bank)
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IV. Monetary developments
As the open positions on their balance sheets were reduced,
commercial banks also began winding up their total long for-
eign currency positions. Hence, the bank’s total open positions
were brought to zero in early July, simultaneously with a ma-
jor drop in the exchange rate. As the on-balance-sheet posi-
tions started to pick up again at that time, the neutral position
was the result of an increase in the derivative position. Thus
the commercial banks broke with the former practice to keep
40-50 billion forints long foreign currency position. The fact
that the open foreign exchange positions were completely
wound up may indicate that while in the previous days com-
mercial banks attributed higher probability to the weakening
of the forint, they were striving to reduce exchange rate risk
exposure in response to the fluctuations in the exchange rate
of the forint.
IV. 4 Long-term yields
The previous Report described the evolution of yields onthe market of government securities up to the end of
April 2002. Since then, until early July yields rose substantially
by as much as 50 to 150 basis points at every maturity, followed
by a moderate decline from the middle of the month (see Chart
IV-11). The rise since April was strongest in the one-to-seven-
year section of the zero coupon yield curve, but it was also
significant at later maturities (see Chart IV-12). A shift in the
implied forward yield curve clearly shows that long-term yields
rose essentially as a consequence of changing expectations
for periods one to six years ahead. As euro yields fell in the
Chart IV-10. Volume and average maturity of non-
residents’ government securities holdings
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IV. Monetary developments
meantime, the forint - euro yield differential increased over the
full horizon (see Chart IV-13 and Chart IV-14).
The change in forint yields can be traced to both interna-
tional and domestic developments and economic news. The
increase in interest rates on the Hungarian government secu-
rities market since late April coincided with the global decline
of risk appetite (see section IV.1). This caused the yield curve
to shift upwards, reflecting an increase in the risk premium
required by foreign investors. On the other hand, a thorough
analysis of the individual shocks and the dates of yield curve
shifts suggests that the Hungarian yield curve has been affected
not only by global factors but also by events in the Central and
Eastern European area, in addition to domestic macroeco-
nomic data. These factors combined have caused expectations
to change, interest rate convergence to lose momentum and
one-to-seven-year long-term yields to increase at a faster pace.
The period with the most pronounced rise in yields in the past
few months followed the publication on May 14 of April infla-
tion, which exceeded analysts’ expectation by as much as 40
basis points (see Chart IV-15). The interest rate hike of 50 basis
points on May 22 did not influence the long-term yields. How-
ever, expectations were adversely affected by a sizeable bud-
get deficit in proportion to the time elapsed and the rapid
growth in real wages. In addition, uncertainty was further ex-
acerbated by the difference in the government and the central
bank’s views on the schedule for disinflation and fiscal deficit
reduction. The unfavourable Central and Eastern European and
Hungarian macroeconomic data and economic policy news
(see section IV.2.), released in early July, triggered a surge in
the yields on government securities, pushing them to levels
characteristic of the period 8-13 months before, depending on
maturity. The rise in non-resident investors’ required risk pre-
mium, the alteration of domestic investors’ inflationary expec-
tation and the increase of the required real interest rate could
provide the primary explanation for this.
In May and June, market analysts’ forecast for the year-on-
year price index in December 2002 fell outside of the toler-
ance range specified by the Bank, with expectations worsen-
ing not only for this year, but also for 2003 (see Chart IV-16
and Chart IV-16). The middle of July, however, saw a turning
point, as the upward trend of yields experienced for several
months seemed to break. The underlying factor was the NBH’s
interest rate hike of 50 basis points on July 9, which was inter-
preted by the market participants as evidence of the Bank’s
strong commitment to disinflation. Also the agreement be-
tween the Government and the central bank on medium-term
macroeconomic strategy has had a positive impact on expec-
tations, coinciding with the publication on July 11 of a lower-
than-expected inflation figure. This mitigation of uncertainty
has brought analysts’ inflation expectation for the year-end
(5.4%) within the Bank’s tolerance band, according to the
Reuters’ survey. Although the rate of price increases predicted
for the end of next year (4.82%) is also lower than it was in
June, the rate exceeds the expectation of three months before,
and is still outside the Bank’s inflation target range(see Chart
IV-17). According to the Reuters’ survey in July, six out of eleven
macroanalysts expect inflation to be in the target band in De-
cember 2002, compared with just two in December 2003. Nev-
Chart IV-12. Zero coupon yield curves
Chart IV-13. Forint and euro one-year implied
forwards
Chart IV-14. One-year forint - euro implied forward
differential
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ertheless, the market analysts’ inflation forecast for the subse-
quent one and a half years remains inside the 30% probability
range around the Bank’s forecast, which assumes that the mon-
etary policy will remain unchanged (see Chart IV-18).
An implication of the shift in the Hungarian yield curve is
that the aforementioned developments have, in all likelihood,
caused investors to view the date of Hungary’s joining the euro,
the endpoint of convergence between euro-area and Hungar-
ian interest rates, as postponed until a later date. This also seems
to be supported by Czech and Polish officials’ statements re-
flecting a weakened political commitment on the part of their
governments to early euro-area participation. Market expecta-
tions indicate that the chances that Hungary will join the euro
in 2006 have declined since early May, and the probability of
the 2007 date was also lower in July. This is reflected in the
divergence between the one-year forint and euro implied for-
ward differentials calculated for constant dates (2006-2008) and
their jump high above the country risk premium estimated to
roughly 50 basis points (see Chart IV-19). One-year forwards
four to six years ahead rose not only because of the July in-
crease in the risk premium along the entire duration of the
yield curve, but also as a result of higher interest rate expecta-
tions caused by slower disinflation and interest rate conver-
gence affecting the nearer section of the yield curve most mark-
edly.
In sum, while the interest rates required on euro-area invest-
ments were falling, the Hungarian yield curve shifted upwards
over the full maturity horizon, due to an increase in the risk
premium induced by a combination of adverse global, regional
and country specific factors. The yield rise was more marked
over the medium term, possibly because of higher inflation
expectations, increasing required real interest rates and rising
uncertainty about the date of joining the euro. On the other
hand, the publication of the Government’s medium-term mac-
roeconomic programme, also supported by the Bank, had a
favourable impact on investor expectations over the near term.
Over the long term, achieving the objectives laid down in the
programme may reinforce the credibility of economic policy,
which may lead to a major drop in the yields on government
securities, via reducing interest rate expectations and the risk
premium.
IV. Monetary developments
Chart IV-16. Reuters’ survey of inflation
expectations for end-2002 and end-2003, trimmed
means
Chart IV-17. Analysts’ expected inflation paths
between May – July 2002
Chart IV-18. Analysts’ expectations compared with
NHB forecast
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V. 1 The exchange rate pass-through
to domestic prices – model
calculations
It has been repeatedly underlined in the Bank’s previousanalyses that the nominal exchange rate’s effect on the level
of domestic prices, in short the extent of exchange rate pass-
through, is of utmost importance from the perspective of
disinflation. The Bank’s previous analyses were primarily fo-
cussed on the exchange rate pass-through coefficient in respect
of tradable goods, this being the area where the exchange rate
most clearly coordinates prices.37 But it is important not only
to look at the pass-through profile in respect of tradables, as
the ultimate question of exchange-rate based disinflation is
what kind of disciplinary role the nominal exchange rate ex-
erts on the overall CPI or at least on some aggregate market-
related price index.
It stands to reason that in general equilibrium the size of
exchange rate pass-through is subject to the behaviour of all
markets of the economy, and is thus determined by labour
market conditions and fiscal policy just as much as by pricing
behaviour. Mark-ups applied by companies on a given set of
costs are determined by their pricing behaviour, i.e. how fre-
quently they implement price changes.38 Their behaviour is, in
turn, governed by cyclical conditions within the economy, the
level of inflation and the credibility of monetary policy. The
situation on the labour market affects pricing behaviour via
wage and hence cost changes, and is thus obviously another
determinant of the pass-through profile, in addition to pricing
behaviour. Fiscal policy is crucial, primarily in relation to cred-
ibility over the longer term and hence the coordination of in-
flation expectations.39
The effects noted above can be analysed systematically us-
ing the NIGEM model.40 According to simulations by the Bank’s
economists, the exchange rate channel affects the rate of infla-
tion in the following way:
V. Special topics
37 For a discussion of the effect exchange rate change has on inflation, see the Au-
gust 2001 issue of the Report.
38 Engel (2002) “The Responsiveness of Consumer Prices to Exchange Rates and the
Implications for the Exchange Rate Policy: A Survey of a Few Recent New Open
Economy Macroeconomic Models” NBER Working Paper 8725
39See Krekó-Világi (2002), Fiscal Policy and Disinflation, NBH manuscript.
40 On the NIGEM model in general, see Jakab-Kovács (2002) “Hungary in the NIGEM
model” NBH Working Papers 2002/3. Specifically about the simulation, see Jakab-
Kovács (2002) “Explaining Exchange Rate Pass-Through: Some Simulations with
the NIGEM Model”  paper presented at the  ECOMOD Conference, Brussels, July
2002. (dow loadasle)
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1. In the first year of appreciation, reduction in costs via
import prices (price adjustment) and expectations play
the most pronounced role. The latter is taken to repre-
sent the extent to which economic agents have a for-
ward-looking attitude when setting wages and prices.
2. Disinflation implemented via reducing the output gap
begins to be more marked in the second and third years
(mark-up fluctuations). At this stage, the disinflationary
effect of the direct reduction in import prices weak-
ens, and a further drop in inf lation can only be
achieved at the cost of a growth sacrifice.
3. The labour market achieves primary significance from
year the 4th. As a result of the growth sacrifice, there is
a rise in the unemployment rate. Disinflation contin-
ues subject to the flexibility with which wages respond
to the decline in labour demand (nominal wage flex-
ibility).
4. The pace of mutual adjustments between productiv-
ity and real wages (real wage adjustment) plays a rela-
tively minor role in exchange rate pass-through.
The Bank’s results reveal a one- to two-year lag between the
dates from which adjustment in the goods market and in the
labour market begin to make a mark in respect of disinflation.
This can be partly attributed to the fact that while price change
affects disinflation directly, labour market adjustment has an
indirect impact. On the other hand, not only does labour mar-
ket adjustment feed through to prices with a lag, but there is
also a phase lag between wage adjustment itself and the de-
cline in inflation. This appears to be the case, because while
the effect of imports-side cost reduction is immediately passed
through to consumer prices, firms tend to adjust wages only
as competitiveness deteriorates.
V.2 How large is the inflation
differential vis-á-vis Europe? Some
results from a new comparative study
In this paper we try to summarise the size of the real appreciation driven by relative productivity differentials i.e. the
Balassa-Samuelson (BS) effect in five Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean (CEC5) countries, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. An interesting fea-
ture of the study is the unified analytical framework that we
apply for all of the countries, which makes the individual re-
sults comparable. Our new study in the NBH Working Paper
Series (no. 2002/5) is joint research of CEC5 central bank ex-
perts.
Our approach is based on the use of two methods. Firstly,
we create a common simple analytical framework for produc-
ing some stylised facts, and obtaining an estimate of relative
price movements due to different sectoral productivity growth
rates. Secondly, we try to summarise the econometric evidence
available for the countries, both from individual country and
panel estimates.
It seems clear from the analyses, based on the alternative
approaches, that the BS effect on CPI inflation vis-á-vis Ger-
V. Special topics
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many does not exceed 2% per annum. The numbers obtained
are somewhat different from those that one would obtain from
the change in relative prices in the countries considered. This
result might be explained by the fact, that in the past, other
factors like change in the sectoral wage rates, pricing behaviour
and intermediate product prices also contributed to the devel-
opment of the nontradable and tradable price ratio.
As these estimates are based on past data, when productiv-
ity differentials were higher than current figures, it is very likely,
that as the catching-up proceeds, the magnitude of the BS ef-
fect will be even smaller. This would suggest that the real con-
vergence should not endanger the fulfilment of the Maastricht
Treaty inflation criterion.
V. 3 How do central banks in Central
Europe forecast inflation?
What do they forecast and what methods are applied? Whatroles the monetary policy decision makers and the ex-
perts play in preparing the inflation forecast? Why and how
much is it important to inform the general public on the fore-
cast? One can find answers for these types of questions in the
paper No. 2002/2 recently published in English language in
the NBH Background Studies series. The paper, which exam-
ines the inflation forecasting practice and the related institu-
tional framework at the central banks of five Central European
countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and
Slovenia), was initially prepared for the Basle meeting of the
Governors of the five central banks on 11th of March, 2002.
The first part of the paper presents the general aspects of
the comparative analysis, which primarily follow the require-
ments of inflation targeting monetary regimes applied by three
of the five central banks (Czech, Hungarian and Polish). The
second part consists of individual country case studies, which
give detailed description of the institutional framework and
forecasting practice at the five central banks considered. The
paper is the first to give insight into the forecasting practice of
the five Central European central banks, while another inter-
esting feature is that, beyond the common framework of analy-
V. Special topics
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sis, the country case studies were written by experts from the
individual banks. A brief summary of the analysis is presented
in the table below.
V. 4 An analysis on the potential
effects of EU entry on Hungarian
food prices
Do food prices in Hungary conceal inflationary tensions?We analysed this issues in the 2002/1. issue of NBH Back-
ground Studies. Our analysis takes a look at the potential di-
rect effects of EU accession on food prices, aiming to assess
whether domestic food prices conceal an ‘inflationary bomb”
which could be ignited by the accession.
It is a widely held idea in Hungary that joining the EU will
cause a rapidly and strongly rising domestic food price level
vis-ŕ-vis EU prices. The arguments can be separated into two
parts. On the one part many argue that intervention prices of
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) are likely to exert up-
ward pressure on certain domestic agricultural producer prices.
On the other hand, say some current consumer price differen-
tials between domestic and EU prices will also disappear. The
question carries great significance on account of Hungary’s
ambition to join the euro area, as the next stage of integration
following entry into the EU. Meeting the relevant Maastricht
criteria requires, inter alia, reducing inflation to a very low level.
As the two years following EU accession are crucial from the
point of view of satisfying the inflation criteria, this period has
been chosen as the focus of the following analysis.
We have found that the domestic agricultural producer
prices for those products mostly relevant for the CPI, had ap-
proached the level of those in European countries by the late
nineties. This was mainly not due to the price-equalising role
of free trade, but rather that the result of flat-to-rising trend of
domestic producer prices in terms of euro, has occurred si-
multaneously with a downward movement in European price
levels over the past decade. This process has gained further
momentum from the persistent appreciation in the exchange
rate of the forint. Although there is product having more cru-
cial importance in domestic consumption (sugar beet) which
is likely to increase in price in the aftermath of EU accession,
we do not expect this to generate overall inflationary shocks.
Finally, there are also prices, which might increase as a result
of Hungary’s adoption of the common agricultural policy in
the wake of the EU entry, for instance fodder prices, but due
to high meat prices, this is not likely feed through to inflation.
The retail price level of food products, on the other hand, is
well below the EU average in Hungary. The reason for this
seems to be lying in the high weight of non-tradable inputs
(such as wages, land and supplementary services) or other local
factors (e.g. different degree of perishability and in consumer
preferences, etc). As the price level of the former tends to de-
pend on the degree of economic development, food prices
may permanently vary across countries of different stages of
development. The latter factors tend to hamper goods arbitrage
in general.
V. Special topics
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Our conclusion is that, over the longer term, retail food prices
will converge to the level of the EU countries. However, this
will take place simultaneously with the overall catching up of
the Hungarian economy and last decades. Thus we do not ex-
pect the EU entry to increase domestic food prices.
V.5 A handbook on Hungarian
economic data
What can be considered a time series and what cannot be
considered one? How can one prepare raw data for analysis?
What indicators should one use to assess cyclical, inflation or
equilibrium developments within the Hungarian economy?
What is to be done if there are as many as four different mea-
sures available describing the same phenomenon? How can
one access Hungarian economic data? Which data series are
downloadable and which can be found only in traditional pa-
per-based publications?
To answer these and similar questions, the National Bank
brought out in July a Handbook on the Use of Hungarian
Data.41  The purpose of this publication is to share with the
public the Bank’s experience obtained in the analysis of do-
mestic economic statistics. We explain what type of data we
consider as relevant in assessing Hungarian economy, and vari-
ous methods of using such data. In particular, the 19 chapters
of the Handbook deal with one specific subject-matter each,
providing valuable assistance in understanding the procedures
and forecasts presented in the Bank’s Quarterly Report on In-
flation.  This looks at the analytical and forecasting tools used
by central bankers is intended to enhance transparency and
predictability of monetary policy decision making.
Of the topics in the first edition, it may be worth drawing
attention to the methodological and theoretical background
underlying the fiscal stance indicator applied in the Bank’s
analytical work, and - by way of a detour – to the methodologi-
cal comparison of four widely used fiscal deficit indicators. A
description of the statistical tools applied in assessing the do-
mestic labour market may also be useful in understanding ana-
lytical practises. Finally, the publication is breaking new ground
by highlighting the Hungarian household and corporate con-
fidence indices which, in the Bank’s experience, are a leading
indicator of domestic economic trends.
The Handbook is only published in an electronic format,
downloadable from the National Bank’s homepage. Several
indicators referred to in the Handbook and unavailable in a
time series format elsewhere, as well as the Bank’s own crop
of indicators (for the fiscal stance, wage inflation and the
Reuters survey’s consensus inflation expectations series) have
been published on the Bank’s homepage.42
The publication will be updated on a regular basis, as need
may be and as far as it is possible. We would welcome any
comments and suggestions from readers.
41 At the time of the publication of this Report only the Hungarian version of
the Handbook is available for download (see Kézikönyv a magyar gazdasági
adatok használatához). The English version would also be published soon on
the NBH website.
42 See under Financial Data / Statistical Time series  on the NBH website.
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V. Special topics
V. 6  The economic consequences of
adopting the euro
Following Hungary’s EU-accession, entry into the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union (EMU) will be the next major
step in the country’s European integration process. EMU-
entry will eventually entail giving up the national currency
and introducing the euro as the domestic means of payment.
In our most recent Occasional Paper we analysed the costs,
benefits and optimal timing of the introduction of the com-
mon currency.43
In our cost-benefit analysis, we tried to quantify the three
major benefits of euro-zone membership. These gains are a
result of (1) lower transaction costs, (2) increasing foreign trade
and (3) lower real interest rates together with a more relaxed
current account constraint. The most important measurable
cost of introducing the euro is a reduction of seigniorage in-
come. According to our estimates the measurable benefits of
the euro are significantly bigger than the measurable costs. As
a result, introducing the euro would significantly increase
Hungary’s long-term potential growth rate and speed up the
(real) convergence towards the core euro-zone countries.
The effect of the euro on the volatility of the Hungarian
business cycle and its welfare consequences are much harder
to measure. By introducing the common currency, Hungary
loses a potential policy tool (the exchange rate) with which,
in principle at least, it would be able to smooth out part of
the asymmetric shocks. However, giving up the national
currency also means that a potential source of asymmetric
shocks (emerging market financial contagion) is eliminated.
Once in the euro-zone, the probability of asymmetric shocks
affecting Hungary is not larger than in less developed cur-
rent member states. The reasons for this are similar produc-
tion structures, advanced trade integration and synchronised
business cycles between Hungary and the euro-zone. Ad-
justments through flexible goods and labour markets and
discretionary measures of fiscal policy in Hungary are able
to handle the remaining asymmetric shocks at least as effi-
ciently as in less developed current EMU member states. Our
analysis therefore shows that Hungary and the euro-zone
in most respect constitute an optimal currency area.
Many factors influence the optimal timing of the introduc-
tion of the euro. On the one hand, quick disinflation and fis-
cal contraction currently needed to an early euro-zone entry
may increase the real costs of the euro. On the other hand, as
long as Hungary stays out of the euro-zone, it is exposed to
potentially disruptive speculative capital flows. Moreover, a
commitment to an early euro-zone entry, especially if it is
based on a consensus between the Government and the cen-
tral bank, sets out a more or less well-determined “end-point”
of the nominal convergence process for market participants.
The existence of such an “end-point” increases the credibil-
ity of the disinflation programme and, having a favourable
effect on inflation expectations, eventually reduces the cost
of disinflation.
43 Attila Csajbók – Ágnes Csermely (eds.): Adopting the euro in Hungary: expected
costs, benefits and timing. NBH Occasional Papers No. 24. Forthcoming in English.
Hungarian version published in June, 2002.
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